with a third person. (2) Consent must be given voluntarily as the result of the person’s free will assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances 149. 76. Another paradigmatic precedent in the definition of consent as an appropriate parameter for sexual violation comes from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) in the Case of Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vokovic (2001), 150 already discussed in the judgment. 151 On that occasion, the Court needed to establish a definition for the crime of "rape" crystallized in common Article III of the Geneva Conventions and constituting a crime against humanity, upon verifying that there was no definition of "rape" in the International Humanitarian Law. 152 After carrying out an in-depth study, the Court of First Instance concluded that the parameter should be the absence of the victim’s consent to the sexual act, and that this consent must be given voluntarily, of free and spontaneous will, and must be evaluated in the context of the circumstances of each case. 153 The prisoners filed an appeal in which they argued that the correct standard of the crime of rape was the "use of coercion or force", and not the "lack of consent." 154 The Court of Appeals rejected this appeal, consolidating that "the force or the threat of force provides clear evidence of lack of consent, but force is not a per se element of rape" - thus reinforcing the consent standard. 155 77. Also within the framework of International Criminal Law, the International Criminal Court, when defining the rules of evidence for the crimes of the Rome Statute (which includes sexual violence in its article 7(1)(g), established the standard of consent and specified in the following terms: Rule 70: Principles of evidence in cases of sexual violence In cases of sexual violence, the Court shall be guided by and, where appropriate, apply the following principles: (a) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim where force, threat of force, coercion or taking advantage of a coercive environment undermined the victim’s ability to give voluntary and genuine consent; (b) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim where the victim is incapable of giving genuine consent; (c) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of the silence of, or lack of resistance by, a victim to the alleged sexual violence; (d) Credibility, character or predisposition to sexual availability of a victim or witness cannot be inferred by reason of the sexual nature of the prior or subsequent conduct of a victim or witness. 156 78. Although this Court has not had the opportunity to analyze, prior to the present case, a situation as similar to that of Ms. Losada as the aforementioned European 149 150 Cf. Judgment, para. 139. As stated by the European Court in M.C. v. Bulgaria, although the rulings in the case Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vokovic (2001) of ICTY were issued in the particular context of a rape that occurred during an armed conflict, the case reflects a universal trend towards the adoption of the criterion of absence of consent as an essential element of the crimes of rape and sexual abuse. Cf. ECHR. MC v. Bulgaria, no. 39272/98, 2003, para. 163. 151 Cf. Judgment, para. 138. 152 Cf. ICTY (Trial Chamber). Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac y Vokovic. Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (2001). 153 Ibid. 154 Cf. ICTY (Appeals Chamber). Prosectuor v. Kunarac, Kovac e Vokovic. Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1T (2002). 155 Ibid. 156 Cf. ICC. Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, First session, New York, 3-10 September 2002 (ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1), part II.A. 26