to consent, explaining a series of circumstances that would generate said presumption: violence or threat, restriction or confinement, state of unconsciousness, intoxication, mental disability, physical disability, impersonalization, deception, exploitation of coercive power, pretext of cultural, ancestral or religious practices or social, cultural or religious disadvantage. I consider that such parameters effectively reinforce those that were already introduced in the judgment: (…) The Court considers it necessary that criminal law also establish that consent cannot be inferred (i) when force, threat of force, coercion or taking advantage of a coercive environment has diminished the victim's ability to give a free and voluntary consent; (ii) when the victim is unable to give free consent; (iii) the victim's silence or lack of resistance to sexual violence, and (iv) when there is a power relationship that forces the victim to carry out the act for fear of its consequences, taking advantage of an environment of coercion. (...) The Court considers that it is essential that the regulations concerning crimes of sexual violence provide that consent cannot be inferred, but must always be offered expressly, freely and prior to the act and that it can be reversible. By virtue of this premise, as this Court has already pointed out, in the face of “any type of coercive circumstance it is no longer necessary for the concept of consent to occur because that circumstance has, without a doubt, eliminated consent.” 167 IV. On the imperative to give greater visibility to incestuous rape and the appropriateness of establishing a specific nomen juris for this purpose. 89. The Case of Angulo Losada v. Bolivia revealed, in addition to the difficulties in adequately protecting victims of sexual violence due to the lack of effective incorporation of the standard of consent discussed above, particularities of the legal approach to incestuous rape that also led to the revictimization of Ms. Losada. 168 The Court considered that, due to the differentiated nature of incestuous rape in relation to other forms of rape and its differentiated impact on the rights of children, the crime requires a specialized approach by the State. 169 I therefore determine that the State had to adapt its legislation to give greater visibility to the crime of incestuous rape, and that this visibility had to be given through the attribution of a specific nomen juris in the Criminal Code to the classified conduct. Below, I will set out the reasons why the adoption of a specific nomen juris for incestuous rape is an appropriate remedy in the case at hand. a. The approach to incest by the Bolivian legal system 90. Since the entry into force of the current Bolivian Criminal Code in 1972, the aggravating circumstances of sexual crimes are specified in its Article 310. The original text established that the death of the victim would increase the penalty for rape from 10 to 20 years and for statutory rape from 4 to 10 years, and three circumstances that would increase the penalty by one third: serious damage to the victim's health, the concurrence of two or more people in the act and the case where “the perpetrator was ancestor, descendant, brother, half-brother, or person adopting or in charge of the education or custody of the victim. 170 Thus, we have the classification of incest as an aggravating circumstance of sexual crimes in the Criminal Code – but without the term “incest” being used in the legislation. 167 168 169 170 Cf. Judgment, para. 148. Ibid., para. 200. Ibid., para. 201. Original text available at: http://www.silep.gob.bo/norma/4368/texto_ordenado. 30