100. As regards the right to an independent tribunal, the Commission sees that the Argentine State explained that the Impeachment Jury is an organ of a political nature. Indeed, in terms of its composition, 5 of its 11 members have to be senators who meet certain requirements. The Commission considers the legislative branch having a decisive say in punitive proceedings against judges to be problematic and as constituting, per se, a source of risk to the independent exercise of such a function, since such proceedings do not offer the proper institutional guarantees or suitability that the judiciary would. However, both the Commission and the Court have taken up cases in which the legislative branch has been granted material adjudicatory authority in punitive proceedings against judges. In those cases, the analysis as to whether or not it acted independently was conducted taking into account the circumstances of each specific case.76 Thus, the Commission considers that, notwithstanding the aforementioned risks, in the instant case the petitioner merely indicated that the San Isidro Bar Association had an interest in harming him in reprisal for the accusations of corruption that he leveled at his peers on the court on which he sat. However, the IACHR has no additional elements by which to infer the above. At the same time, the petitioner indicated in general terms that because of the way in which they are appointed, members of the Impeachment Jury are not shielded from external pressures. However, he does not explain what type of pressures might have been exerted upon them or how they might have influenced the decision. 101. In light of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that in the circumstances of this case the Argentine State did not violate the right to a competent, independent tribunal. 2. Regarding the right to an impartial tribunal 102. In disciplinary proceedings instituted by the legislative branch, the guarantee of impartiality (Article 8(1) of the Convention) remains wholly applicable since the decisive aspect for determining the respective guarantees is the punitive nature of the power being exercised by the authority in question. The guarantee of impartiality entails that the members of the Impeachment Jury “have no direct interest in, a preestablished viewpoint on, or a preference for one of the parties, and that they are not involved in the controversy.”77 When impartiality is being determined, regard must be had, from a subjective standpoint, to the personal conviction and behavior of a judge in a given case, but also, from an objective perspective, if sufficient guarantees are offered in the proceeding to exclude any legitimate doubt in that respect.78 The right to an impartial tribunal is the guarantee that the decision will be adopted based on the reasons that the law provides and not on other criteria that have nothing to do with the legal framework. The importance of that is particularly acute where punitive matters are concerned and even more so in punitive proceedings against judges, bearing in mind the principle of judicial independence, as described earlier. 103. Relating the foregoing to impeachment, as it mentioned when it referred to such proceedings, the Commission reiterates that because of the risks that it poses to judicial independence, it should be used only in exceptional cases for judges and in all instances it should be ensured that the control exercised is legal and not political. To do otherwise would be to allow reasons other than those that the law envisages into the decision-making process on the propriety of a judge's punishment, which constitutes undue interference in judicial independence. 104. In spite of the foregoing, in the present case the Commission does not find concrete elements that suggest that the Impeachment Jury which heard the case acted politically motivated so that its subjective impartiality - which is presumed - in application of the disciplinary grounds, would be compromised. 76See, for example, Case of the Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et al.) v. Ecuador; and Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru. Both cases were considered first by the Commission and then by the Inter-American Court. 77I/A 78 Court H.R., Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 135, par. 146. See, ECHR, Case of Thomann v. Switzerland, Judgment of 10 June 1996, § 30.