American Convention, the Commission is competent to hear this case against the Dominican Republic. 23. From the background information analyzed, it appears that the Commission is competent ratione personae and materiae to hear this case, since the complaint lodged reports events that represent alleged violations of the rights of Narciso González, as recognized in Articles 4 and 5 of the American Convention on Human Rights (Articles 44 and 47(b) of the Convention). 24. The Commission considers that there are no grounds supporting the allegation that the complaint is patently unfounded or without merit (Article 47(c)). Likewise, the complaint is not the substantial duplication of a petition already examined, nor is it pending proceedings by another international entity, although this objection has not been alleged by the parties, nor does it duplicate a petition already considered by the Commission or another international entity (Articles 46(c) and 47(d). 25. From the various letters sent to the Commission, it is apparent that the domestic remedies pursued in the Dominican Republic have been unsuccessful in producing any information regarding the disappearance of Narciso González. On May 28, 1994, the petitioners filed a petition for investigation of the report that he was in the custody of the National Police. The investigation has not produced satisfactory results so far. 26. The government of the Dominican Republic, in the only information provided to the Commission during the entire year and a half of the process, merely indicated that "all elements in the country are looking for Dr. Gonzalez" and that "all necessary remedies will be exhausted to ensure a prompt and successful response in this case." However, it did not provide any specific information regarding the remedies that were being pursued. With these statements, the Dominican government would seem to be alleging that domestic remedies had not been exhausted. 27. In this case, following the principle of onus probandis incumbit actoris, the government has the obligation to show which are the remedies that must be exhausted and to prove that they have not been exhausted. The government of the Dominican Republic never responded specifically on these points, despite the repeated requests by the Commission. 28. In application of the aforesaid principle, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has indicated as follows: "... the State that alleges non-exhaustion has responsibility for indicating the domestic remedies that must be exhausted and their effectiveness."1 29. In the case in point, the petitioners alleged that the domestic remedies were not effective and presented information in this regard. However, more than a year and a half following the disappearance of Professor Narciso González, the investigations pursued by the national authorities indicate that no progress has been made in clarifying the event. This demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the domestic remedies and constitutes an unjustified delay in any decision regarding those remedies. Finally, the Dominican government itself, which alleged that "all the necessary remedies for a prompt and successful response in this case have been exhausted," did not provide any proof at all of the existence and the effectiveness of those remedies, which represents a failure to fulfill its obligation under Article 43 of the American Convention. 30. The Commission considers finally that the case of Professor Narciso González entails the actual situation covered by Article 46.2.b of the Convention, and that therefore the condition of exhaustion of domestic remedies, as stipulated in Article 46.1.a., is not applicable.2 31. The provisions of Article 46.b of the Convention, which establish that any petition may be presented within a period of six months counting from the date on which the final decision was 1 "Velásquez Rodríguez," Preliminary Exceptions, Judgment of June 26, 1987, par. 88 2 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in Velásquez Rodríguez, Judgment of July 29, 1988, paragraph 155, states as follows: "The forced disappearance of human beings constitutes a multiple and continuous violation of a number of rights recognized under the Convention." These rights include, among others, the right "to lodge appropriate appeals to control the legality" of detention. 3