18 iv) The limitation introduced by the State gives rise to “two different levels of protection for victims of human rights violations,” because “contrary to violations occurring after recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction, it allows certain continuing violations to be excluded from the jurisdictional scope of the Court, thus creating two levels of supervision for these acts.” The first level is applicable to all human rights violations that commenced after June 6, 1995, when the alleged victims are totally protected by the Court’s jurisdiction. The second level, is applicable to human rights violations that commenced before June 6, 1995, and which continue after this date, in which case the alleged victims of this type of violations are totally unprotected “due merely to a decision of the State”; v) “If the State’s arguments are accepted, this would imply that the acts of State agents intended to destroy evidence that might help determine the whereabouts of the girls or acts of obstruction of justice could be excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction, if, as the State claims, it is considered that these acts commenced with the [alleged] abduction of the girls; namely, on June 2, 1982”; vi) The condition for the recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction invoked by El Salvador “cannot be applied to this case, which deals with continuing violations. Moreover, it is contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention, because it creates categories of [alleged] victims”; vii) The condition for the recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction invoked by El Salvador “has the effect of reducing the effectiveness of the protection mechanisms established by the American Convention, because it excludes from the Court’s jurisdiction those persons who are victims of continuing human rights violations, even after recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction, if these violations commenced before June 6, 1995”; and viii) Some of the reported acts occurred after June 6, 1995. These included: the filing of the petition for habeas corpus on November 7, 1995; the delivery of the judgment by the Constitutional Chamber of El Salvador on March 14, 1996; and measures taken in criminal proceeding 112/93, “which had the effect of obstructing and delaying the proceeding, including the closure of the investigation on two occasions: March 16 and May 27, 1998.” Also, the Army assumed an obstructive attitude to the investigation because, on four occasions, the special prosecutor requested permission to inspect the logbook and, to date, his request has not been followed-up on. There are evident avenues of investigation that have not been followed, such as conducting interviews in children’s homes where the girls could have been. These omissions imply State complicity to hide the facts and the whereabouts of the alleged victims. Considerations of the Court