37 in which it declared that the defendant States had violated the American Convention owing to actions in the context of a non-international armed conflict.21 The Court has also protected members of communities by adopting provisional measures “in light of the provisions of the American Convention and international humanitarian law,” given that they were in a situation of extreme gravity and urgency in the context of an armed conflict.22 Hence, international human rights law is fully in force during internal or international armed conflicts. 114. Article 27 (Suspension of Guarantees) of the American Convention clearly establishes that the Convention continues operating in time of war, public danger or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State Party. 115. Likewise, in Article 3 common to all the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, international humanitarian law establishes the complementarity of its norms with international human rights law, when it establishes, inter alia, the obligation of the State in the case of armed conflict not of an international nature to provide humane treatment, without any adverse distinction to persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by any cause. In particular, international humanitarian law prohibits, at any time or in any place, violence to the life, integrity and dignity with regard to the above-mentioned persons.23 116. Moreover, the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, relating to the protection of victims of non international armed conflicts (Protocol II), acknowledges in its preamble the complementarity or convergence of the norms of international humanitarian law and those of international human rights law, when it states that “[…] international instruments relating to human rights offer a basic protection to the human person”. And, Article 75 of Protocol I to these Conventions, on the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (when referring to fundamental guarantees for all persons who are in the power of a Party to the conflict and who do not benefit from more favorable treatment under the said Conventions or under that Protocol), and Article 4 of Protocol II( when referring to the fundamental guarantees of all persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted), indicate that such persons are entitled to such guarantees, thus embodying the complementarity of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. 117. It should also be stressed that, when referring to the normative it should observe when carrying out its mandate, the Truth Commission for El Salvador indicated that “the concept of grave facts of violence, as used in the Peace 21 Cf. Case of Molina Theissen. Reparations, supra note 14, paras. 15 and 41; Case of Molina Theissen. Judgment of May 4, 2004. Series C No. 106, para. 40 and third and fourth operative paragraphs; Case of Bámaca Velásquez. Reparations (Art 63(1) American Convention on Human Rights). Judgment of February 22, 2002. Series C No. 91, para. 85; and Case of Bámaca Velásquez, supra note 15, paras. 143, 174, 207, 213 and 214. 22 Cf. Matter of the Pueblo Indigena de Kankuamo. Provisional measures. Order of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights of July 5, 2004, eleventh considering paragraph; Matter of the Communities of Jiguamiandó and Curbaradó. Provisional measures. Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of March 6, 2003, eleventh considering paragraph; and Matter of the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó. Provisional measures. Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of June 18, 2002, eleventh considering paragraph. 23 Cf. Case of Bámaca Velásquez, supra note 15, para. 207.