47 legal arguments were incorrect, is also incompatible with the scope of Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention. 218. Therefore, the Commission concludes that the Argentine State violated, to the detriment of Saúl Cristián Roldán Cajal, the right recognized in Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention, in relation to the obligations set forth in articles 1(1) and 2 thereof. 2.4 Ricardo David Videla Fernández 219. The IACHR has established as proven fact that Ricardo David Videla Fernández’ private defense attorney filed cassation motions to challenge the verdict and sentence in each of the following cases joined in the judgment: 121/02, 112/02, 109/02, 110/02, 117/02 and 116/02. The issues raised in these motions can be summarized as follows: a failure to disqualify certain pieces of evidence; misapplication of the substantive law; a lack of legal reasoning, illogical reasoning and the arbitrary nature of the sentence. All the motions were formally dismissed by the Mendoza Supreme Court in a decision dated April 24, 2003. 220. According to the proven facts, one of the main arguments used to justify dismissal of the motions was the absence of arguments showing clearly and concretely how the so-called invalid or unlawful evidence had a “decisive and essential” impact on the decision. The Mendoza Supreme Court decided to deny the cassation motion on procedural grounds and did not examine the merits of the claims. In its view, merely claiming an irregularity was not sufficient to warrant a review of the use of a certain piece of evidence. As was indicated in the section on general standards governing the right to appeal a judgment, one of the characteristics of the remedy contemplated in Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention is that it must be accessible; in order words, formal or procedural requirements cannot be used as a means to thwart access to a review. The Commission considers that the position taken by the Mendoza Supreme Court unduly restricted the right to have a conviction reviewed and thereby prevented Ricardo David Videla Fernández from exercising the right recognized in Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention. 221. The Mendoza Supreme Court also deemed that the cassation motions were used to raise questions that are not subject to review at this “exceptional and restrictive” stage. Specifically, the Mendoza Supreme Court observed that the motions did not accept facts that the lower court had deemed to be established, which “inevitably limited” the review function that the court of cassation could perform. In this regard, the Commission has already concluded in previous sections that positions of the kind taken by the Mendoza Supreme Court limit the scope of review by precluding claims made regarding matters of fact and the weighing of evidence, which is incompatible with the right to appeal a judgment. 222. The Commission therefore concludes that the Argentine State violated, to the detriment of Ricardo David Videla Fernández, the right recognized in Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention, in relation to the obligations undertaken in articles 1(1) and 2 thereof. 3. Observations on subsequent developments concerning the right to appeal a judgment. 223. The Commission has concluded that the Argentine State violated the right to appeal a judgment, recognized in Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention, to the detriment of César Alberto Mendoza, Claudio David Núñez, Lucas Matías Mendoza, Saúl Cristián Roldán Cajal and Ricardo David Videla Fernández. 224. These violations were not the result of a single interpretation by one judge. Instead, they occurred in the context of a law and/or practice that precluded a review of the facts and the weighing and taking of evidence. Accordingly, the Commission concluded that the State not only violated the right recognized in Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention, but also its obligation to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to that right, as set forth in Article 2 of the Convention.