72 124. The Court will now examine whether the definition of the crime applied in the alleged victim’s case during the processing her trial before the civil jurisdiction violates the principle of legality. 125. Concerning the principle of legality in the penal sphere, the Court has indicated that crimes must be classified and described in precise and unambiguous language that narrowly defines the criminalized conduct, establishing its elements, and the factors that distinguish it from behaviors that are either not punishable or punishable but not with imprisonment. Ambiguity in describing crimes creates doubts and the opportunity for abuse of power, which is particularly undesirable when it comes to ascertaining the criminal liability of individuals and punishing their criminal behavior with penalties that exact their toll on fundamental rights such as life or liberty.228 126. Under the rule of law, the principles of legality and non-retroactivity govern the actions of all State organs, in their respective spheres of competence, particularly when they must exercise their powers to punish.229 127. The relevant Peruvian legislation in this case establishes different categories of crime, such as: terrorism,230 treason,231 and collaboration with terrorism.232 In turn, the latter has various manifestations. The Inter-American Court has noted that the definition of the crime of treason is incompatible with the American Convention.233 This category of crime was not considered as regards Lori Berenson in the ordinary criminal proceeding (supra para. 88(69)); nor was the crime of terrorism applied in that trial. However, some forms of collaboration with terrorism were invoked and applied, and the sentence handed down was based on them. According to Peruvian legislation, collaboration does not constitute a form of participation in terrorism, but rather, it is an autonomous crime committed by anyone who carries out specific acts which support terrorist activities. Evidently, the assessment of the existence, when applicable, of acts of collaboration, must be made in relation to the definition of terrorism. In the Court’s opinion, the definition of the crime of collaboration with terrorism does not have the same defects that, at one time, were observed with regard to the crime of treason. This Court does not consider that these categories of crime are incompatible with the provisions of Article 9 of the American Convention. 128. In view of the foregoing, and with regard to the trial and judgment in the civil court, the Court considers that it has not been proved that the State violated Article 9 of the American Convention to the detriment of the alleged victim, by applying Article 4 of Decree Law No. 25,475. 228 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 3, para. 174; and Case of Cantoral Benavides, supra note 25, para. 157; and Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al., supra note 25, para. 121. 229 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 3, para. 177; and Case of Baena Ricardo et al., supra note 216, para. 107. 230 Cf. Article 2 of Decree Law No. 25,475. 231 Cf. Articles 1 and 2 of Decree Law No. 25,659. 232 Cf. Article 4 of Decree Law No. 25,475. 233 Cf. Case of Cantoral Benavides, supra note 25, para. 155; Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al., supra note 25, para. 119; and Case of Loayza Tamayo, supra note 25, para. 68.