16 subsidiarity exists, by virtue of which, once domestic jurisdiction has been exhausted, recourse may be had to the Inter-American Court. In a pluralist society, such as that of Chile, the courts are independent and there are sectors of the magistrature whose concept of the legal system leads them to maintain that prohibitions may be ordered by invoking other constitutional guarantees, such as those in article 19(4) of the Constitution on honor and intimacy. The Chilean magistrature is extremely legalistic. Chile has not violated Articles 12, 13, 1(1) and 2 of the Convention, because the fact that judges have delivered judgments contrary to those articles is not sufficient grounds for maintaining that the State violated the Convention. The Convention should be interpreted and applied pursuant to its Article 30, because it is not sufficient that an act may theoretically or doctrinally be codified as or constitute a violation of a rule or law, but rather the context must be taken into consideration – which is that of a pluralist, democratic system with separation of powers - and the intention of the provision. The principle of international law according to which the State is responsible for the acts of the organs of the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary, is a nonconventional principle, which is contained in and should be complied with by virtue of jus cogens. Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties recognizes that a State party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform international treaties. In the instant case, Chile is not alleging its internal law in order to fail to perform the provisions of the American Convention. Formal legal texts include international norms, but, unfortunately, there are sectors of the profession and the magistrature in Chile that have not been receptive to this situation. g. Expert report of Francisco Cumplido, constitutional law and political law. lawyer, expert in He has advised the Government of Chile and the National Congress on constitutional reform from 1963 to 1973 and from 1990 to date. The President of the Republic, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate take part in the constitutional reform procedure, as a derivative constituent power, and it is governed by the Legislature’s normal rules for processing reforms. The 1980 Constitution, reformed in 1989, simplified the constitutional reform procedure; however, this still requires majorities in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate for specific matters. In general, three-fifths of the current Deputies and Senators are required to adopt a constitutional reform, although two-thirds are required in some cases. When the chambers are not in agreement, there is a third procedure and if disagreement persists, the procedure may be transferred to a joint commission. Some reforms have taken two years, others seven. Some have required extensive negotiations. Negotiations and agreements have been necessary for most constitutional reforms, owing to the integration of the political majorities. The draft constitutional reform to suppress cinematographic censorship was sent to the National Congress by President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle on April 15, 1997, and has already been adopted in the first constitutional procedure by the Chamber of Deputies. This period of less than 3 years is completely normal. The Senate will probably introduce amendments to the draft reform to adapt it to the provisions of