23 would imply that in cases where detainees were disappeared, it would be wiser for the families not to investigate the whereabouts of their relatives. 57. The Commission also stated that the forced disappearance was corroborated by the testimonies and documents submitted; that in the sub judice case the Court is competent, ratione temporis, to decide on Mr. Nicholas Blake's forced disappearance which, although initiated before the date on which Guatemala accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the Court, extended in time beyond that recognition. It further pointed out that, with regard to the evidence, a great deal of direct evidence concerning the events had been submitted. According to the Commission, this evidence proved the participation of specific persons in the crime and, moreover, that these persons were agents of the State and members of the Army and civil patrols; that the civil patrols acted in direct coordination with military personnel and were institutionally dependent on the Army; and acted directly as State agents, both in the initial execution of the crime and in the actions to cover up the forced disappearance and encourage impunity. 58. The Commission pointed out in its application that, with regard to Mr. Nicholas Blake's disappearance, "the continuous inaction on the part of the Government of Guatemala, which in the instant case continue[d] for more than ten years, involve[d] violations of many rights" and that there were subsequent acts which constituted specific violations, independent of those deriving from the forced disappearance. 59. In that connection, the State argued in the answer to the application that during a brief period on March 28, 1985, an ordinary, finite crime was committed. It therefore rejected the Commission's introduction into the field of international protection of human rights, aspects specific to criminal law, such as the concepts of sequence of crimes and continuing crimes. It considered out of order the Commission's argument that the effects of a completed crime continued and extended until such time as the corpus delicti was located. 60. The State also argued that the detention of Mr. Nicholas Blake and Mr. Griffith Davis, their transfer by the perpetrators to a remote spot for the crime to be committed, and the concealment of their bodies to hide material evidence are typical elements of common criminal acts such as aggravated homicide or murder, and not of human rights violations. Nor did it accept that the perpetrators' concealment of the bodies in order to hide material evidence, clues and traces of the crime should be considered a forced disappearance of persons, as the Inter-American Commission claims. 61. Guatemala also maintained that Mr. Nicholas Blake had not been intercepted by any agent of the State, taken to a place of detention, nor subjected there to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or torture, and, further, that he was not interrogated by any authority, nor forcibly or involuntarily disappeared or executed by the State. * * * 62. The Court notes that Article II of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons defines forced disappearance in the following terms: the act of depriving a person or persons of his or their freedom, in whatever way, perpetrated by agents of the state or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of the state, followed