64 anticipate how long he or she will be deprived of liberty. All these conditions will be examined in the following section in light of the facts that the IACHR takes as proven in this case. 1.3 An examination of the facts in this case 189. Taking account of the parties’ allegations, the Commission will begin by examining whether the original warrant for Mr. Wong Ho Wing’s provisional arrest was or was not an arbitrary detention under Article 7(3) of the Convention. The Commission will then examine the duration of Mr. Wong Ho Wing’s detention, in light of Article 7(5) of the Convention, and then turn its attention to the question of whether the appeals and other remedies that Mr. Wong Ho Wing invoked to secure his freedom met the requirements of Article 7(6) of the Convention. An analysis of whether the original provisional arrest warrant was arbitrary 190. As for the first point, i.e., the warrant for the alleged victim’s provisional arrest, the Commission notes that Mr. Wong Ho Wing was detained on October 27, 2008, and the next day his provisional arrest was ordered. From the facts established, the Commission notes that the reason cited for this measure was the necessity ��of ensuring that the person in question […] remains in the country while the request for his extradition is processed [as he] has not yet accredited either his domicile or employment in the country.” Mr. Wong Ho Wing filed an appeal, specifically arguing that he had accredited the fact that he had established himself in Peru and give evidence of his financial investments in the country. This appeal was decided on December 11, 2008, when the court confirmed the warrant for his provisional arrest, arguing that the legal requirements for issuing a provisional arrest warrant had been met, which is that his presence within the national territory had been established and the crime for which his extradition was sought was also a crime in Peru. As the facts established in this case show, in the decision upholding the warrant for Mr. Wong Ho Wing’s provisional arrest, Callao’s First Transitory Mixed Superior Court Chamber expressly stated that the concept of “procedural risk” did not have to be examined, because this was not a criminal case instituted in Peru, but a “provisional arrest made for purposes of extradition.” The information available indicates that with that ruling the warrant issued for Mr. Wong Ho Wing’s provisional arrest became final and, based on such criteria, the detention continues up to date. 191. The Commission appreciates that what this judicial authority is attempting to do, is to draw a distinction between the concept of preventive detention and the concept of a provisional arrest with a view to a person’s extradition. The reasoning in this decision is that a provisional arrest can be ordered merely by establishing that the person located is the person whose extradition is being sought, and by establishing that the crime for which extradition is sought is also a punishable offense in the requested State. 192. The Commission reiterates that while preventive detention and provisional arrest with a view to extradition are parts of different processes and the domestic laws that govern them may differ according to the distinctive features of the processes of which they are part, in both cases an individual’s personal liberty is curtailed even before he or she is convicted of any crime; therefore, under the American Convention, preventive detention and provisional arrest must be governed by the same principles described above. Summarizing the key elements of the case law cited, a provisional arrest with a view to extradition must be the exception and not the rule; it must be for purely procedural ends that must be examined on a case-by-case basis; it must also be determined whether other, less onerous means can be used to achieve the same ends.