65 193. The Commission does not share the view that “procedural risk” is an irrelevant consideration when determining whether provisional arrest is in order. The Commission understands that the specific procedural ends or procedural risks in a criminal case already underway may be different in the context of a request for extradition. With a request for extradition, the “flight risk” or “risk of procedural obstruction” must be weighed not as a function of a criminal case, but as a function of the purpose for which the process was conceived, i.e., extradition. Thus, in order to be compatible with the American Convention, a provisional arrest with a view to extradition must pursue the procedural end of making it possible for extradition to eventually happen. The court authority who orders provisional arrest must explain why the same end could not be accomplished without placing the person in question under provisional arrest or by other means less restrictive than deprivation of liberty. The Commission notes that Peru’s own Code of Criminal Procedure contemplates alternatives such as barring the person from leaving the country or withholding said person’s passport (see Article 523(9) of that Code, supra, Facts established). 194. Based on the foregoing, the Commission considers that the provisional arrest warrant issued by Callao’s First Transitory Mixed Superior Court Chamber on December 11, 2008, in its decision on the appeal filed challenging the provisional arrest with a view to extradition was arbitrary under Article 7(3) of the American Convention. Analysis of the duration of the provisional arrest 195. On the matter of the duration of the provisional arrest, the Commission observes that Mr. Wong Ho Wing has been deprived of liberty under a provisional arrest from October 27, 2008 to the present; in other words, four years and nine months. By the standards described above, in particular the precedents established by the European Court on the question of detention with a view to extradition, when examining the question of whether the duration of the detention was excessive and thus a violation of the Convention, the Commission’s considerations will be the diligence applied in the extradition process that prompted the deprivation of liberty and the concept of foreseeability. 196. As for whether the extradition process that prompted the deprivation of liberty has been conducted with “due diligence”, the Commission finds first that four years and nine months taken to settle an extradition process is, prima facie, problematic and requires a sufficient explanation from the State of the reasons why a final decision has been so long in coming. These considerations are examined in the sections on the procurement of diplomatic assurances and the guarantee of a reasonable time. As indicated in those sections, the State was responsible for omissions and irregularities with respect to the procurement of diplomatic assurances (infra paragraphs 252 - 289) that affected the duration of the process and, as a result, the personal liberty of Mr. Wong Ho Wing. As to the guarantee of a reasonable time, the Commission does not find any justification for the delay based on the factors considered when examining the guarantee of a reasonable time (infra párrs. 297 - 302). 197. The Commission also observes that since the Second Transitory Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice issued an advisory resolution; under the applicable Peruvian laws, this decision triggered the second stage of the process, which is the responsibility of the Executive Branch. In response, the petitioner filed a petition of habeas corpus against authorities in the Executive Branch. The May 24, 2011 ruling that the Constitutional Court issued on this petition was in the petitioner’s favor, and ordered the authorities in the executive branch to abstain from extraditing Mr. Wong Ho Wing to the People’s Republic of China. As will be examined later in this report, a series of mechanisms