allows people to effectively determine their conduct pursuant to law.80 According to the IACHR, “the lawfulness principle has a specific development in its typicality, which insures, in the one hand, the individual freedom and security, since it establishes in an advanced, clear, and unequivocal way which conduct is to be punished and, in the other hand, it protects legal security.”81 83. Furthermore, the duty of motivation is translated into “the reasoned justification” that allows the judge to come to a conclusion.82 Both the Court and the Commission have emphasized that the requirement of an appropriate level of motivation is highly relevant, since the disciplinary control —and in this case, the assessment and ratification proceeding with absolutely punitive consequences— has the aim of assessing the conduct, aptitude incumbent on the role, and performance of public workers, thus, it is in the motivation itself where it is necessary to analyze the conduct charged and the proportionality of the punitive consequence.83 84. Moreover, the Commission recalls that the duty of motivation has an intrinsic relationship with the lawfulness principle, since the causes leading to a punishment —particularly to the consequence of not continuing in the role of judge or prosecutor— shall be established in the State’s legal framework pursuant to the standards aforementioned, the argumentation of a judgment shall allow knowing “the facts, motives, and regulations on which the authority was based to adopt a decision.” 84 In this sense, it is the motivation of a punitive decision the one that allows understanding the way in which the facts supported the proceeding, adjust to or fall into the field of the appealed causes. The motivation proves to the parties that they were heard and provides them of the possibility of criticizing the resolution and achieving a new examination of the matter before the higher courts.85 85. Likewise, the IACHR established that the “utmost severity principle” of the dismissal punishment of a judge implies that only “clearly reprehensible,” “truly serious reasons for bad behavior or lack of jurisdiction” conducts are admissible. 86 The protection of the judicial independence demands that the dismissal of judges be considered as ultima ratio in legal disciplinary matters. 87 Justice operators’ tenure implies that the dismissal corresponds to quite serious conduct, while other punishments can be observed as malpractice or negligence before events. 88 The Commission considers that these assessments are equally applicable to the non-ratification decision of a judge or prosecutor, in the terms regulated in the Peruvian case, at the moment of the non-ratification of the alleged victims. This, as long as the said decision, in practice, has the same absolutely punitive effect of preventing them from continuing in their roles, for reasons of absence of aptitude incumbent on the role for that effect. 86. In this case, the Commission could verify that the resolutions passed by the NCM were unmotivated at the moment of ordering the non-ratification of the alleged victims. The State itself recognized IACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/SER.L/V/II.116, Doc. 5. rev. 1, corr., October 22, 2002, para. 225, and Executive Summary, para. 17. 81 IACHR, Petition and Pleadings before the Inter-American Court on Human Rights in case De la Cruz Flores vs. Peru; mentioned in: IAHR Court, Case De la Cruz Flores vs. Peru, Judgment of November 18, 2004 (Merits, Reparations, and Indemnities), Series C. No. 115, para. 74. 82 IAHR Court, Case Maldonado Ordoñez vs. Guatemala. Preliminary Exception, Merits, Reparations, and Indemnities. Judgment of May 3, 2016. Series C No. 311, para. 87. 83 IAHR Court, Case Maldonado Ordoñez vs. Guatemala. Preliminary Exception, Merits, Reparations, and Indemnities. Judgment of May 3, 2016. Series C No. 311, para. 84 IACHR, Report No. 103/13, Case 12,816, Merits Report, Adán Guillermo Lopez Lone and others, Honduras, para. 145. 85 IAHR Court. Case Apitz Barbera and others (“First Administrative Law Court”) vs. Venezuela. Preliminary Exception, Merits, Reparations, and Indemnities. Judgment of August 5, 2008, Series C No. 182, para. 78. 86 IAHR Court. Case López Lone and others vs. Honduras. Preliminary Exception, Merits, Reparations, and Indemnities. Judgment of October 5, 2015. Series C No. 302, para. 259. 87 IAHR Court. Case López Lone and others vs. Honduras. Preliminary Exception, Merits, Reparations, and Indemnities. Judgment of October 5, 2015. Series C No. 302, para. 259; IACHR, Report No. 38/16, Case 12,768, Merits, Omar Francisco Canales Ciliezar, Honduras, August 31, 2016, para. 71 ff. See also IACHR, Independence remedies for justice operators. The Road toward Strengthening the Access to Justice and the Rule of Law in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc.44, December 5, 2013, para. 211. In the said report, the IACHR considered that “the legal provisions establish administrative punishments, such as dismissals, shall be subjected to the most strict lawfulness discernment. The said regulations include a punishment of extraordinary seriousness and restrict the enforcement of rights. Moreover, given that the regulations constitute an exception to judicial stability, they can affect the principles of independence and legal autonomy.” 88 IAHR Court. Case López Lone and others vs. Honduras. Preliminary Exception, Merits, Reparations, and Indemnities. Judgment of October 5, 2015. Series C No. 302, para. 199. IACHR, Report No. 26/18, Case 12,839. Merits. Ricardo Vaca Andrade. Ecuador. March 2, 2018, para. 107. 80 16