include William Huacón as a victim or beneficiary of reparation measures. The representatives reported in this regard that they “believ[ed] that the only persons who should be considered victims are the direct relatives of the mortal victims” (supra para. 10). 28. First, the Court deems it necessary to highlight the importance of the parties and their representatives acting in good faith within the framework of the international process. It is not consistent with this for those representing victims or alleged victims in a process to claim to act in defense of their rights and interests and then, when actually exercising that representation, fail to do so, as happened in this case. 29. Second, this Court recalls that, within the framework of its competence and functions as a human rights court, it is incumbent upon it to evaluate the admissibility and legal effects of the friendly settlement agreement reached by the parties. 16 In that sense, this Court has found as follows: [I]n exercise of its authority to ensure the international judicial protection of human rights, a matter of international public order that transcends the will of the parties, it is incumbent upon the Court to ensure that acts of acknowledgment of responsibility and possible agreements between the parties are admissible for the purposes of the inter-American system. This task is not limited to merely verifying, recording or taking note of the acknowledgment made by the State, or to confirming the formal conditions of such acts; rather, the Court must examine them in keeping with the nature and seriousness of the alleged violations, the requirements and interests of justice, the particular circumstances of the specific case, and the attitude and position of the parties, so that it can clarify the truth about what happened insofar as possible and in the exercise of its competence. 17 30. The foregoing, in turn, must be considered bearing in mind the pro persona principle, a hermeneutic criterion that must govern the understanding of human rights norms. It arises from Article 29 of the American Convention, which calls for an extensive interpretation of rights and a restrictive understanding of their limitations. 31. Therefore, and given that, as indicated (supra para. 14), the terms of the agreement include an acknowledgment the State's international responsibility with respect to all the facts and human rights violations identified by the Inter-American Commission in the Merits Report, William Huacón must be considered a victim and beneficiary of the measures of reparation. 18 IV JURISDICTION 32. The Inter-American Court has jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to Article 62(3) of the American Convention, given that Ecuador has been a State party to this instrument since December 28, 1977, and accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the Court on July 24, 1984. Cf. Case of García Cruz and Sánchez Silvestre v. United Mexican States, supra, para. 17; and Case of the Miskito Divers (Lemoth Morris et al.) v. Honduras, supra, para. 18. 16 Case of García and family members v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 29, 2012, Series C No. 258, para. 16. See, in the same sense, Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of May 2, 2008. Series C No. 177, para. 24; Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment dated May 26, 2010. Series C No. 213, para. 17 and, Case of the Massacres of El Mozote and nearby places v. El Salvador. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of October 25, 2012. Series C No. 252, para. 23. 17 18 It is therefore clarified that, henceforth, when this judgment refers to "family members," this includes William Huacón. 9