3 this Court’s decisions when it had to weigh the effects of a reservation or a restriction. The decision handed down in the Case of Serrano Cruz is the most recent example of the Court fulfilling its duty in this area. The situation under consideration in the instant case is different from the one in such case. Hence, the different determinations adopted. Whereas in one case, competence is restricted in terms that are admissible, though maybe not desirable, in the instant case competence is limited altogether. 8. From the point of view of the effectiveness of the Inter-American human rights protection system, refusal by a State to fully honor the commitments undertaken, from which the international liability affirmed by the Inter-American Court derives, constitutes a cause for major concern. It is possible for a State to abstain from signing or ratifying a treaty; likewise, it is possible for it to include in the recognition of the contentious jurisdiction of the Court the restrictions expressly authorized by the Convention; and, finally, it is also possible for it to denounce the Convention. However, it seems at least inexplicable that, having agreed to the Pact, a State would later decide to disregard the obligations derived therefrom, or to subject them to conditions, or to fulfill them in ways that are not provided in the treaty. 9. It is highly desirable that careful consideration of these issues and the need to strengthen the human rights protection system will prompt a review that can contribute to attain the lofty purposes set by the Charter of the Organization of the American States, the American Declaration and the Pact of San José, in accordance with the decisions adopted by the States that are part of the Inter-American community themselves. II. PUNISHMENT BY FLOGGING 10. Probably, the most notorious issue as to the merits of the case is the persistence and imposition of flogging —as provided in the State’s law— as corporal punishment, administered with a whip called the “cat o’ nine tails”. The characteristics of this instrument are described in the judgment according to the evidence on the record. There is no doubt that its use causes the person receiving the punishment most severe pain. The Court’s stance on this issue, as stated in the judgment, is of complete and outright rejection. In this regard, the Court has taken into account a reasoned line of thought which is dominant both nationally and internationally, repudiating the use of any form of punishment that is, because of its characteristics and because of the pain it inflicts on the convict, incompatible with human dignity, on the one hand, and with the generally recognized purposes of the punishment imposed on convicts, on the other. 11. As a result of this, the convict becomes a victim of the State whose role in punishing criminal behavior has gone astray from its purpose and overstepped its mark. Certainly, the need — and the public duty — to decisively fight crime and punish offenders is undeniable. What is objectionable is that this punitive role, in itself lawful, be carried out in such a manner and by such means as to render it grievous to human dignity and that conflict with the ethical standards that must be the hallmark of the democratic State in the exercise of all of its powers, including the power to punish. As I have stated in the past, it is in the punitive order, perhaps more than in others, that the political convictions and moral design of a State become apparent. 12. The foregoing is applicable regardless of whether the individual involved be, in turn, a victimizer in the commission of a punishable offense. If his criminal liability is established, the individual must be punished. It seems unnecessary to