8 global and regional documents, especially after the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Geneva, 1995) which have been with us for half a century now, and despite being widely known they are frequently ignored. Once again, reality has rebelled against the law. Speeches and facts go different ways. 32. Based on the prevailing circumstances —as evidenced by the judgments of the Inter-American Court and by several provisional measures ordered by the Court— and on the notion, stated by this Court on several occasions, regarding the role of the State as guarantor with respect to the persons in custody —adults or juveniles, healthy or ill— it becomes apparent that there is a pressing need to embark as soon as possible on a comprehensive and true reform of the arrest systems. This includes laws, measures, facilities, security personnel and alternatives to imprisonment, among others. Certainly, the paradoxes and deficiencies of imprisonment are many. To which must be added, worsening the state of affairs before us, the recurrent or constant violation of rules which, if observed, could contribute at least a somewhat acceptable arrest system. 33. It has been asserted, on abundant evidence, that correctional facilities are usually the scene of constant, systematic and deep-rooted violations of human rights, which also are frequently of the most serious nature. In this regard, it is important to look back on a large number of judgments or orders regarding provisional measures pronounced in the past few years, such as Urso Branco Prison, Juvenile Reeducation Institute, Bulacio, Neira Alegría, Mendoza Prisons, Lori Berenson, Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al., etc. The judgment on the Case of Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago now adds to this list. The violation of rights resulting from the intolerable conditions prevailing in many prisons already constitutes one of the major issues brought before the Inter-American jurisdiction. V. PROPORTIONALITY OF PUNISHMENT 34. In the instant case, consideration could have been given to the reasonableness —which, in the instant case, implies lawfulness— of the punishment consisting of the deprivation of liberty prescribed by law and imposed by the judge. Within the framework of criminal law in a democratic society, which entails careful classification of unlawful conduct and the reasonable assessment of its consequences, an adequate gradation of punitive reactions according to the legal interests attained and to the damage or the risk caused. The greater the legal interest protected through the classification of offenses and the damage or risk caused, the harsher the punishment imposable. It is not admissible to punish attempt, which is the offense referred to in the records submitted in the instant case by the competent authorities, with the heavy sanctions that should be imposed on a perfected criminal act. If this principle is set aside, as is the case here, the principle of proportionality of punishment will be attained. 35. The problem of the sanction becomes more apparent in the light of its legal quantitative imprecision, with the potential excesses that may result from it, which became a reality in the case brought before the domestic jurisdiction, which provides no ground whatsoever to opt for a specific term of imprisonment. As a result of this lack of sufficient grounds, the punishment imposed becomes discretionary. Section 31(1) of the Offences against the Person Act, which contains the type of offense (purportedly) considered in the instant case, sets forth that: “Any person who is convicted of the offense of rape is liable to imprisonment for life or for any term of years.” It follows that, any rape, regardless of the surrounding circumstances, and even the degree of perpetration reached in the iter criminis — which, in the instance case, amounted to attempt— is subject to a sanction that may range from one year to life imprisonment, at the discretion of the Court.