14 68. The Commission notes that Law No. 24159 of June 6, 1985, in force at the time of the facts, set the rules to be observed during states of emergency in which the armed forces assumed control of law and order in all or part of the nation’s territory, establishing for that purpose Political/Military Commands under high-ranking 23 military officers. Thus, the functions and powers of the civilian authorities during the state of emergency were 24 restricted or subordinated to the Political/Military Command. Later, the enactment of Legislative Decree 749 of 25 November 12, 1991, expanded the authority of the Political/Military Commands. That decree gave the officers in charge of Political/Military Commands responsibility not just for coordinating but for leading all government 26 actions at all levels and made available to them economic and logistical resources and personnel. 69. From the enactment of Decree Law 25.659 in August 1992 until November 24, 1993, no guarantee remedies were admissible in cases involving terrorist crimes. Even if the innocence of the defendant had been established, judges were prevented at all times from granting any form of conditional release, amparo relief, or habeas corpus. This legislation was amended with the passage of Law 26248 on November 24, 1993. 27 Nevertheless, the amendments made still contained various procedural restrictions. 2. Repentance Law 70. On May 12, 1992, the executive branch of government enacted Decree Law No. 25499, known as the Repentance Law, which regulated the reduction, exemption, remission, or attenuation of punishment of people prosecuted for or convicted of the crime of terrorism who provided information intended to lead to the arrest of the leaders, heads, chiefs, or main members of terrorist organizations (Arts. 1.II.a and 1.III), together with terrorist activities. By means of Supreme Decree No. 015-93-JUS of May 8, 1993, the executive branch enacted the Regulations of the Repentance Law, which provided, inter alia, for changing or keeping secret the identity of repentant informants (Articles 8.a and 36). The Repentance Law (Decree Law 25499) expired on October 31, 28 1994. 71. This Law established the terms whereby a series of “benefits” could be granted to the perpetrators of terrorist crimes who repented, including the reduction or cancellation of their punishments. The Repentance Law concluded by calling on people involved with the outlaw movements to amend their stance and to hand themselves over to the authorities or to military bases, because their security and that of their families – which was fully guaranteed – depended on that, and thereby to “bring about their reincorporation into society as 29 individuals willing to work for national peace and to live within the framework of the law.” The Repentance Law, according to the CVR’s Report, was a severe blow to the outlawed armed groups and fueled mistrust even among 23 According to Article 4 of Law No. 24150: “Control of law and order in emergency zones shall be assumed by a Political/Military Command led by a high-ranking officer appointed by the President of the Republic, following a proposal made by the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, who shall perform the functions of that position as established in this law in the area of his jurisdiction, in accordance with the orders and emergency plans issued by the President of the Republic.” 24 Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru, Vol. VI, Section Four: Crimes and Human Rights Violations, Chapter 1: Patterns in the Commission of Crimes and Human Rights Violations, 1.6 Violations of Due Process, 1.6.6. State of Emergency, Illegal Arrests, and Guarantee Actions, p. 465. 25 Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru, Vol. VI, Section Four: Crimes and Human Rights Violations, Chapter 1: Patterns in the Commission of Crimes and Human Rights Violations, 1.6 Violations of Due Process, 1.6.6. State of Emergency, Illegal Arrests, and Guarantee Actions, p. 465. 26 Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru, Vol. VI, Section Four: Crimes and Human Rights Violations, Chapter 1: Patterns in the Commission of Crimes and Human Rights Violations, 1.6 Violations of Due Process, 1.6.6. State of Emergency, Illegal Arrests, and Guarantee Actions, p. 465. 27 Annual Report of the IACHR 1993, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85, Doc. 8 rev., February 11, 1994, Chapter IV: Situation of Human Rights in Several States, Peru. 28 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/39/Add.1 of February 19, 1998, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of the judiciary and lawyers, Mr. Param Cumaraswamy, Report on the Mission to Peru, para. 65. 29 Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru, Vol. IV, Section Three: The Scenarios of the Violence, Chapter 1: Violence in the Regions, 1.4 The Northeastern Region, 1.4.3.3. Military Offensive and Declining Violence: 1993-2000, p. 362.