11 45. Article 25 of the American Convention establishes a precious guarantee, which is exactly, the “guarantee of guarantees,” the “right that serves all rights.” This guarantee, this right, is the culmination of a protective system that ultimately places its expectations in a means of defense that all may resort to and that all may satisfy. This provision states that “(e)veryone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights (...).” Likewise regarding this point and apropos of the judgment in the instant case, but also in a large number of cases –actually, all those heard by the Inter-American Court-, we must ask ourselves about the “effectiveness of effective recourse,” about the simplicity and promptness that define it in the strict and sufficient terms of the Convention, which does not go much farther than the point reached by many national constitutions. 46. Is the recourse foreseen truly “effective,” in the sense that it enables a real defense of fundamental rights, always and under all circumstances? Is it truly “simple”, in that it can be known, understood, used by any citizen –since it was established to protect any citizen- who needs that protection? Is it truly “prompt,” in the sense that it ensures very rapidly, not after months or years, protection of a right whose protection admits no delay without causing severe and irreparable damage to the person entitled to that right? Has an effective system of remedies been built, overcoming unnecessary complexities, useless technicalities, inadmissible obstacles? The panorama that the Court usually has before it does not attest to this, as shown by the frequency with which it finds violations of Article 25. Observance of the latter would remove from its venue the vast majority of matters heard by the international court. XII. Defense 47. Defense of the accused continues to be in a predicament. As far as I know, there is no domestic legal order that does not stipulate his right to defense against the charges against him, as well as the right to have legal counsel to assist him in the difficult period of prosecution, when his most valued interests are at stake. This is, even, a personage that integrates, as has been said, the procedural personality of the accused. Yet numerous cases that have been heard by the Court (and thousands more awaiting their turn: not to come before the inter-American court, but to benefit, through domestic legal systems and venues, from the progress set forth in international instruments) in which there has been no defense at all, or it has been nominal: distant and foreign to the accused, inactive, indifferent, or lacking a real possibility and genuine opportunities to fulfill a mission that is recognized, but not fostered. 48. Reform of the proceeding, based on the requirements of the national Constitutions and of international instruments, and providing full access to justice, must establish a true and effective defense system that strives to ensure the rights of the accused, with the same perseverance and consistency that Inhering recommends that we struggle for the law. Otherwise, of what use is this auxiliary means of the accused, which is also, in the best sense, an auxiliary to justice? This urges us to move toward new means to ensure access to justice. Traditional court-appointed counsel -usually overloaded with cases and with officials whose work conditions are not always, or are only rarely, appropriate to effectively carry out their responsibility- can hardly be sufficient. The problems of court-appointed counsel have been evident in several cases brought before the Inter-American Court.