90 legitimate use. If they have been damaged, they must repair them or pay the compensation set by the judge, except in case of unavoidable accident or force majeure. […] Legal action for compensation for damages due will be in order. 213. It has been proven that the belongings that Daniel Tibi had with him at the time of his detention were seized. The list drawn up for this purpose by the police includes 85 items, encompassing a larger number of objects (supra para. 90(40)). The State has not disputed this fact, but rather pointed out that when the judge asked Mr. Tibi to demonstrate “pre-existence and property” of the goods seized, all he did was argue that property of said goods was on record in the proceedings. According to the State, this is not sufficient to demonstrate said property in accordance with the law. 214. The September 23 or 29, 1998 ruling (supra para. 90(41)), issued by the Second Criminal Judge of the Guayas, Alternate Judge for the Eighteenth Criminal Court of the Guayas with seat in Durán, ordered return of Mr. Tibi’s property, previously upheld by the Sixth Chamber of the High Court of Justice of Guayaquil, for which reason said ruling was consulted to the higher court. The Court has not been informed of the ruling that the High Court of Justice may have issued. 215. Ecuadorian legislation establishes that the property seized from a detainee will be returned to him when so ordered by the Judge. In the instant case there is a judicial decision ordering return of Mr. Tibi’s property (supra para. 90(41)), which has not been executed despite the fact that it was issued six years ago. 216. Article 734 of the Ecuadorian Civil Code establishes that [p]ossession is tenure of a given thing as lord or owner; whether the owner or the reputed owner has the thing on his own behalf, or in the name of and in place of another person. The possessor is reputed owner as long as no other person justifies ownership. 217. In the instant case, Mr. Tibi was in undisputed possession of the goods at the time of his detention. Said possession was documented by a State agent when he drew up the respective record (supra para. 90(40)). 218. It is widely admitted that possession in itself establishes the presumption of ownership in favor of the possessor, and in the case of personalty, it serves as entitlement. This Court deems that Article 21 of the Convention protects the right to property in a sense that includes, among other things, the possession of goods. 219. Regarding the car that Mr. Tibi was driving when he was detained, while it is a personalty that can be registered, this registration is only necessary to object to claims by a third party alleging a right over the good. In the instant case there is no record of anyone having claimed ownership of the vehicle that was in Mr. Tibi’s possession, for which reason it was not appropriate to presume that said good did not belong to him. Therefore, it was in order to respect the possession that he exercised. 220. In brief, Mr. Tibi was using and enjoying the goods seized from him when he was detained. Not returning them to him deprived him of his right to property. Mr.