68 132. The 1984 Ecuadorian Political Constitution, in force at the time of Daniel Tibi’s detention, and the 1996 Political Constitution, respectively in Articles 19.17.j and 28, contain the following provision: [e]very person who believes that he was unlawfully deprived of his liberty can resort to Habeas Corpus. This right can be exercised by the individual himself, or be filed by another person without the need for a written mandate before the Mayor or the President of the Council of the jurisdiction under which he finds himself, or before whoever is acting on his behalf. The municipal authorities will immediately order that the petitioner be brought before them, and that the imprisonment order be shown. Said mandate will be obeyed with no reservation or excuse by those in charge of the social rehabilitation center or place of detention. […] 133. Article 458 of the Criminal Procedures Code established that: [a]ny accused person who is detained in violation of the constant precepts in [said] Code can request his or her release before the Judge above the one who ordered deprivation of liberty. [...] The request will be made in writing. [...] The Judge who hears the request will, upon receiving it, immediately order that the detainee be brought before him, and he will hear his statement, recording it in a certification of the declaration that will be signed by the Judge, the Secretary, and the complainant, or by a witness for the latter, if he does not know how to sign. In said statement, the Judge will request all the information that he deems necessary to develop his own opinion and ensure lawfulness of his ruling, and he will decide what he deems lawful within forty-eight hours. [...] 134. It has been proven that the alleged victim filed a judicial amparo remedy before the President of the High Court of Guayaquil on July 1, 1996, arguing that there is no evidence against him (supra para. 90.28) and therefore he should no longer be detained. On July 22, 1996 the President of the High Court of Guayaquil rejected said judicial amparo remedy, based on the fact that the merits of the charge on which the preventive incarceration was based had not been invalidated (supra para. 90.29). In this regard, the Court observes that Article 7(6) of the Convention requires that a remedy such as this one be decided promptly by the competent court or Judge. In this case, this condition was not fulfilled, as the ruling on the remedy was issued 21 days after it was filed, which is clearly an excessive time. 135. On September 3 or 5, 1997 the Second Criminal Judge of the Guayas, Alternate to the Eighteenth Criminal Judge of the Guayas, issued an order of provisional dismissal of the proceeding and of the charges against the accused, in favor of Daniel Tibi. Said ruling was forwarded to the High Court of Justice of Guayaquil for mandatory consultation, and this ruling was issued on January 14, 1998 (supra para. 90.24). On October 2, 1997 Daniel Tibi filed a second judicial amparo remedy before the President of the High Court of Justice of Guayaquil, when the legal term to decide on the consultation had expired, requesting his release pursuant to the provisional dismissal issued in his favor (supra para. 90.30).