24 trial was commenced. From it we can point out that: a) he had technical assistance from a defense counsel as of the proceeding of preliminary examination [..s]ince it affirms that the court took into account evidence obtained illegally, without the presence of a defense counsel, it is on the record that neither both, or either of them filed a complaint or protested on that opportunity […]: […] There is no violation to Article 12 of the Constitution because the compliance of the judges with the due process can be observed. 3. [The] allegation [regarding that it was not considered proven that Mr. Fermín Ramírez was the person responsible for the death of the minor] lacks support since it was not until the ruling that the trial court declared him as the author of the crime of murder. 4. […] the appeal for review by a higher court [presented by the defense counsel] that gave place to the judgment being appealed [of August 17, 1998], held a different thesis [than that the conviction imposed violated Article 18(a) of the Constitution for having been based on presumptions], expressing that the conviction should have been issued for aggravated rape instead of murder and the punishment should have been imposed within the limits stated in Article 125 of the Criminal Code. […] Presumptional evidence is supported by clues or signs that shed light on facts that are hidden, whose related evidence with the invested act allows to infer its existence, however, said evidence differs, due to its different foundation, from the one used in the sentence, since the evidence produced in the debate and from the documents incorporated through their reading, examined pursuant to the rules of reasoned competent analysis, referred to and assessed […] that were not filled with illegality at the time they were proposed or received, refer without doubt to the defendant and are direct evidence extracted by the judges and assessed applying their logics and rationality when justifying their decision. […] [I]n accordance with that established in Article 44 and 46 of the Law on Amparo, Personal Exhibition, and Constitutionality it is the court’s obligation to decide whether to charge the costs to the applicant, who may be exonerated when he/ she has acted with evident good faith as occurs in this case, as well as on the imposition of a fine for the sponsoring attorney. Being the Amparo notoriously inadmissible, a fine must be imposed in this sense. Therefore: The Constitutional Court […] decides to: I) Den[y] the Amparo requested by Fermín Ramírez or Fermín Ramírez Ordóñez against the Supreme Court of Justice, Criminal Chamber. II) Revoke the provisional Amparo granted. III) Exonerate the applicant of the costs. IV) Impose upon the sponsoring attorneys […] a fine of one hundred quetzales each, which must be paid to the Treasury of this Court within the five days following the date on which the present judgment is definitive; in case of non-compliance it will be collected through the corresponding executive proceeding. […]40 54(25) Mr. Fermín Ramírez’s defense counsel requested a clarification from the Constitutional Court of the judgment of February 18, 1999, regarding the fine imposed on the defense (supra para. 54(24)), clarification that was declared inadmissible on March 1, 1999.41 54(26) On May 14, 1999 the defense counsel presented before the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice an appeal for review against the final judgment of March 6, 1998 issued by the Criminal, Drug Trafficking and Environmental Crimes Trial Court of the Department of Escuintla, in virtue of the fact that all regular and extraordinary appeals were exhausted. It stated that: 40 Cfr. Judgment of the Constitutional Court of February 18, 1999 (dossier of appendixes to the petition, appendix 10, folios 116, 123, and 124). 41 Cfr. Clarification of March 1, 1999 issued by the Constitutional Court (dossier of appendixes to the petition, appendix 11, folios 125 and 126).