68
129. A different threshold of protection should be applied, which is not based on
the nature of the subject, but on the characteristic of public interest inherent in the
activities or acts of a specific individual. Those individuals who have an influence on
matters of public interest have laid themselves open voluntarily to a more intense
public scrutiny and, consequently, in this domain, they are subject to a higher risk of
being criticized, because their activities go beyond the private sphere and belong to
the realm of public debate.
130. Given the foregoing, this Court will now determine whether the criminal
sanction imposed on journalist Mauricio Herrera Ulloa was a necessary restriction in a
democratic society and therefore compatible with the American Convention.
131. In the instant case, the information reported in the Belgian press about
diplomat Félix Przedborski, Costa Rica’s representative to the International Atomic
Energy Agency in Vienna, and his alleged illicit activities, drew journalist Mauricio
Herrera Ulloa’s immediate attention. He reproduced a portion of the news reported
in the Belgian press. The Court notes that journalist Herrera Ulloa basically confined
himself to reproducing the news reports having to do with a public official’s conduct
abroad.
132.
This Court must go on record as noting that as a consequence of his actions,
Mr. Herrera Ulloa was subjected to criminal prosecution and convicted. Invoking
articles 146, 149 and 152 of the Costa Rican Penal Code, the judge ruled that Mr.
Herrera Ulloa’s justification defense (exceptio veritatis) had to be disregarded as he
had failed to prove that the facts that various European newspapers attributed to Mr.
Félix Przedborski were true; instead, the judge wrote, he was only able to show that
“questions were raised in the European press about the party filing the criminal
complaint.”
Thus, the court disallowed the justification defense because the
journalist had not proved the veracity of the facts reported in the European
newspapers. This standard of proof is an excessive limitation on freedom of
expression that does not comport with Article 13(2) of the Convention.
133. The effect of the standard of proof required in the judgment is to restrict
freedom of expression in a manner incompatible with Article 13 of the American
Convention, as it has a deterrent, chilling and inhibiting effect on all those who
practice journalism. This, in turn, obstructs public debate on issues of interest to
society.
134.
The European Court has held the following in this regard:
[…] punishment of a journalist for assisting in the dissemination of statements made by
another person ... would seriously hamper the contribution of the press to discussion of
matters of public interest. 106
135.
The Court therefore finds that the State violated the right to freedom of
thought and expression protected under Article 13 of the American Convention on
Human Rights, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of Mr. Mauricio
Herrera Ulloa, since the restriction on this journalist’s exercise of that right oversteps
the boundaries set in that article.
106
Eur. Court H.R., Case of Thoma v. Luxemburg, Judgement of March 29, 2001, para. 62.
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