21 The right to appeal a ruling before a new higher court under international human rights law implies various elements. First, in its general comment Number 13, the United Nations Human Rights Committee observed that in appeals before review tribunals, care must be taken to watch the way in which the procedures before review tribunals take account of the fair and public hearing requirements of paragraph 1 of Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Second, the right provided for in Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention also implies a determination as to what the court of second instance will review or examine, as there must be a full review of the law and of the facts. The writ of cassation is not an appeal to a higher court in the sense of Article 8 of the Convention. This was also the finding of the Court in the Castillo Petruzzi et al. Case as regards the conditions and requirements that a court of second instance must meet to be deemed a fair, impartial and independent tribunal previously established by law. e. Expert opinion of Carlos Tiffer Sotomayor, attorney Articles 146, 149 and 152 of the Costa Rican Criminal Code are not compatible with the American Convention inasmuch as they do not conform to the principles of a democratic and pluralistic society. Those articles seriously restrict and dampen freedom of expression. Criminal penalties such as those established in the aforementioned articles for the sake of redressing harm to reputation, are not necessary as they do not satisfy any pressing social need. Modern criminal law is governed by two basic principles: the principle of subsidiarity, which holds that criminal law must be used only when no other procedural and legal alternative can serve the same purpose; the second is the principle of ultima ratio, which means that criminal law must be perceived as a last resort. Article 146 of the Costa Rican Criminal Code, which is the article that concerns defamation, is not a description of a separate offense; instead, it describes an exacerbated form of two other offenses: insult and calumny. This article is not up to the standards of a democratic society, as it does not have the most central element of criminal classification: its language is vague and imprecise. Expressions such as “spreads rumours or news of a kind that will affect another’s reputation” place the judge in the position of lawmaker, as it is the judge who decides what constitutes “news of a kind that will affect […] reputation.” Article 149 of the Costa Rican Criminal Code distributes the burden of proof “very poorly.” Under this article, the defendant must prove the truth of the statements. It posits the defense of justification (exceptio veritatis) incorrectly because it applies it as an exculpatory circumstance that applies only after the violation of the law and guilt of the defendant have been decided, when in theory it is a defense that implies a justifying circumstance whereby once the truth of the assertions has been shown, there would be no crime or guilt, and the question of criminal or civil liability would be rendered moot. Article 149 of the Costa Rican Criminal Code reverses the burden of proof, violates such fundamental principles of procedure as presumption of innocence, and seriously restricts criticism of public officials. The article also makes no distinction for the type of passive subject: i.e., public officials