31 f) the State never invoked the exception for failure to exhaust the remedy of review, which means that it tacitly waived this exception. Therefore, by virtue of the principle of estoppel, it is now too late for Costa Rica to invoke the exception for failure to exhaust domestic remedies with regard to the remedy of review; g) the State has tacitly waived the exception alleging Mr. Fernán Vargas Rohrmoser’s failure to exhaust domestic remedies with regard to the petition of habeas corpus, since that objection was not raised during the proceeding before the Commission; h) the State did not expressly state how the petition of habeas corpus would have served as an effective and suitable remedy that Mr. Vargas Rohrmoser should have exercised; i) assuming, arguendo, that the petition of habeas corpus could have been filed, it would have been ineffective based on the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber of Costa Rica’s own Supreme Court, which declared that the petition of habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to appeal convictions in criminal cases or to appeal court orders for enforcement of those criminal convictions; and j) the petition of habeas corpus was neither suitable nor effective for purposes of remedying the consequences of noncompliance with the April 3, 2001 order for enforcement of the sentence delivered against Mr. Vargas Rohrmoser. Pleadings of the representatives of the alleged victims 78. For their part, the alleged victims’ representatives petitioned the Court to reject in limine the preliminary objection claiming failure to exhaust the remedies of domestic law. The representatives argued that: a) in its brief of August 10, 2001, presented to the Commission with regard to the admissibility of the petition that gave rise to the present case, the State did not invoke Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention, which requires prior exhaustion of the remedies under domestic law; b) in a later brief, dated November 30, 2001, the State alleged that Mr. Mauricio Herrera Ulloa had not attempted to bring an action challenging constitutionality. This, according to the State, was the only remedy that, under Costa Rica’s Constitutional Jurisdiction Act, Mr. Herrera Ulloa would have been entitled to invoke. The State cited his failure to exhaust that remedy as grounds for eventual application of Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention. In its briefs answering the petition filed with the Commission, the State tacitly waived the exception for failure to exhaust domestic remedies that it now invokes, except in the case of the action challenging constitutionality; c) even though Costa Rica’s objection claiming failure to exhaust domestic remedies could have been regarded as “belated” and “vague” in its