72 b) in the instant case, the party making the charge was not required to prove the journalist’s culpable conduct; instead, it was the journalist who was required to prove the accuracy of information reported by third parties on another continent; that was the only way he could be acquitted. “A genuine probatio diabolica was forced upon him that left the presumption of innocence devoid of any content or effect;” c) the Costa Rican courts applied the principle of exceptio veritatis to prosecute and convict Mr. Mauricio Herrera Ulloa and the newspaper “La Nación” and thus violated Article 8(2) of the Convention; d) the State violated Article 1(1) of the Convention, in combination with articles 13 and 8 thereof, to the detriment of Mssrs. Mauricio Herrera Ulloa and Fernán Vargas Rohrmoser; and e) Article 2 of the Convention not only requires the States parties to adopt new domestic legal provisions, but also to suppress any law or practice that is incompatible with the obligations undertaken with the Convention. Pleadings of the Commission 138. The Inter-American Commission did not allege violation of articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention. Pleadings of the State 139. The State made no reference to the alleged violation of Article 25 of the Convention. On the matter of Article 8 it asserted that: 139(1) With regard to the right to appeal a judgment to a higher court (Article 8(2)(h) of the Convention): a) the Convention requires that domestic legal systems provide a means to challenge a ruling; it also requires that the remedy be decided by a court higher than the one that delivered the judgment. The second condition is not in dispute. The Court does not demand that the remedy be an ordinary remedy; it only demands that it be a “genuine guarantee that the case will be re-examined” and that the existence of a remedy is not sufficient if that objective is not accomplished. Neither the Convention nor the Court requires that the remedy be one of appeal. The writ of cassation meets the requirements that a remedy must have to meet the standards required by the Convention. “The Convention [does not] require that the [State] have a court of second instance, understood as a body for full review of a ruling delivered by a court from which a case has been removed; what it does require is that States ensure for their citizens that a means will be there to review a ruling by a judge or court of first instance, thus enabling the judgment to be truly reconsidered”; b) courts of cassation used their own rulings to set about the task of removing some of the procedural formality that the writ of cassation involves; those rulings recognize the need to strip away the restrictions that excessive formality causes. Under certain circumstances, courts of cassation have even