6 regard to the risks that the typical formulation of contempt may entail to the freedom of expression. In my opinion added to other judgments of the Court – for instance, case of Herrera Ulloa—I expressed my points of view, which have not changed, on the exercise of criticism with regard to civil servants and the less strict requirement regarding the freedom of expression, if compared with the one which may appear when individuals are involved. What I want to enhance now is that this topic must be analyzed under the light –or the shadow- of the specific criminal formulas, that is to say, in front of “concretions” and not “abstractions.” 21. In other words, what interests and concerns is not the existence of a certain legal classification called “contempt” – a nomen juris which may loose several contents, from acceptable to inadmissible-, but the way in which that criminal concept influences the freedom of analysis and expression, and also the possibility – which was not unnoticed by the Court – that undue repression is exercised through a different criminal definition, as may be the case of the threats. It is also necessary to notice that criticism legalization does not mean to set aside the old guarantee – included in several Constitutions- which protects the members of Parliament and the judges against malicious counterclaims which attack their own capacity of expression or decision, also important for the democratic system. Sergio García-Ramírez Judge Pablo Saavedra-Alessandri Secretary