77 ii) all procedural steps taken against Mr. Palamara-Iribarne were written and, therefore, all submissions were filed in writing, including the statements of witnesses. Mr. Palamara-Iribarne’s counsel was neither allowed to submit his defense arguments orally and directly to the court nor to tender evidence; iii) as some judicial functions have been delegated, the principle of procedural immediacy was not observed. All statements given by Mr. Palamara-Iribarne in the proceedings were taken by a court clerk. The Naval Prosecutor has the power to decide which documents the court will read and which ones it will not. The orders issued by the Military Prosecutor as a general rule are not appealable;” and iv) the State has reformed ordinary criminal procedures (inquisitorial) so that oral ones (accusatory) have been adopted in criminal proceedings. b) Regarding the right to a hearing before an impartial judge or court (Article 8(1) of the Convention), they argued that: i) the State has violated Mr. Palamara’s right not to be tried by a military court, despite his civilian status. Furthermore, “an ambiguous and extremely broad definition regarding who has military status for the purpose of determining who is to be tried by the military courts” is in violation of Article 8 of the Convention; ii) at the time Mr. Palamara wrote his book he was a civilian “contract” employee of the Chilean Navy. Pursuant to the domestic legislation he had civilian status, since as of January 1, 1993 he retired as a Navy active-duty officer. “Therefore, he could not possibly commit any crime in which is the military status of the perpetrator is an essential element (military criminal offenses);” iii) “civilian contract personnel” are not included in the military’s rank system and perform temporary tasks in order to meet contingent institutional requirements. Furthermore, “pursuant to Article 6 of the Code of Military Justice they are not subject to the jurisdiction of military courts;” iv) “as civilian contract personnel are not hired through the Schools of the Armed Forces, nor are they included in their rank system, they cannot possibly be members of the permanent personnel of the Armed Forces;” v) in its judgment, the Court-Martial considered that “civilian contract employees” have military status as they belong to the Armed Forces permanent personnel. This interpretation opposes the provisions of Article 91 of the Political Constitution of Chile, those of Article 10 of the Ley Orgánica Constitutional de las Fuerzas Armadas (Armed Forces Constitutional Organic Law), and those of Article 3 of the Estatuto del Personal de las Fuerzas Armadas (Armed Forces Personnel Regulations);