84 it has further alleged that civilian contract employees have military status. The authorities who exercised the criminal jurisdiction in the trial of Mr. PalamaraIribarne, based on the interpretation of various provisions, understood that as a civilian contract employee he should be deemed to have military status and thus be subjected to the jurisdiction of military criminal courts (supra para. 63(70)). 128. As it has been proven, Mr. Palamara-Iribarne joined the Chilean Navy in 1972 and retired from the Navy as an active-duty officer on January 1, 1993 (supra para. 63(1)). In a previous case, the Court considered that a person having military status and having filed an application for retirement from active duty could not be tried by the military courts.193 In the instant case, it is also taken into consideration that, as it results from the body of evidence, civilian contract employees are not included in the military’s rank system, work in contingent areas which are under an annual renewal system, do not hold positions which are described in the personnel regulations, are not members of the permanent personnel, can be foreign, and have their contracts for services extended annually. Furthermore, civilian contract employees perform “temporary tasks” according to the institutional requirements, whereby they should be subject to the sanctions provided for in labor legislation rather than in criminal military laws. 129. In Chile Article 5 of the Code of Military Justice sets forth, inter alia, that it is incumbent upon the military courts to hear the cases started for criminal offenses included in said Code, except for those crimes which can be classified as military criminal offenses committed by civilians as provided for in Articles 284 and 417 of said Code which, inter alia, contemplate the criminal offense of contempt of authority, and set forth that the proceedings brought for the commission of such offenses must be heard by ordinary courts. 130. The above-mentioned Article 5 of said Code provides that civilians may be tried by military courts in different cases, that military members may be tried by military courts for the commission of ordinary crimes “committed […] in the course of their military duties or as a result thereof […] or in military areas […] or facilities or offices of the Armed Forces,” and that both may be tried for criminal offenses which are not even described in the Code of Military Justice itself, as it recognizes the jurisdiction of military courts over “those cases which, pursuant to special laws, are referred there[to].” 131. Regarding the jurisdiction and proceedings brought for the criminal offense of contempt of authority as described in the Criminal Code which was applied in the case of Mr. Palamara-Iribarne, Article 26 of the Ley sobre Seguridad del Estado (State Security Law) sets forth that the proceedings brought for such criminal offense are to be heard in first instance by the appropriate Military Court, and on appeals by the Court-Martial, where such offenses have been committed by persons subject to the military jurisdiction or jointly by military members and civilians. 132. The Court considers that the provisions which define military criminal jurisdiction in Chile do not restrict trials by military courts to criminal offenses which 193 Cf. Case of Cesti-Hurtado. Judgment of September 29, 1999. Series C No. 56, para. 151.