85 due to the nature of the military criminal legal interests protected are strictly military and constitute serious offenses committed by military members who endanger such legal interests. The Court highlights that such criminal offenses can only be committed by military members during the performance of specific duties related to the defense and external security of a State. In democratic States the jurisdiction of military criminal courts in peacetime has tended to be restricted, if not to disappear, whereby, where it has not, it should be reduced to the minimum and be inspired in the principles and guarantees prevailing in modern criminal law. 133. In the instant case, the broad scope of military criminal jurisdiction applied to Mr. Palamara-Iribarne resulted in the trial of a civilian contract employee by military courts for the commission, inter alia, of criminal offenses which constituted an attack on the “military duties and honor” or which implied “insubordination,” such as the criminal offenses of disobedience and breach of military duties as provided for in the Code of Military Justice, as well as for the commission of criminal offenses which put “public order and security” at risk, such as contempt of authority. 134. It is clear that the criminal offenses for which Mr. Palamara-Iribarne was convicted did not endanger any military legal interests susceptible of criminal protection. The Court further understands that due to the ultima ratio nature of military criminal law, bringing the foregoing criminal proceedings against Mr. Palamara was not the least injurious means the State may resort to in order to protect the interests of the Navy. * * * 135. Furthermore, besides the wide scope of military criminal jurisdiction as derived from the definition of military criminal offenses and the reference to laws which recognize the jurisdiction of military courts, it is to be emphasized that in Chile said courts may hear numerous cases due to the fact that the status of the perpetrator of military criminal offenses is not relevant. 136. Articles 6 and 7 of the Code of Military Justice set forth who is to be deemed to have military status for the purpose of applying the jurisdiction of military courts and refer to other laws to broaden this concept, whereby state authorities take into consideration other legal and statutory provisions in order to interpret the abovementioned articles of the Code of Military Justice. 137. Furthermore, the Court notes that, as it results from the expert and documentary evidence tendered by the parties, during the period from 1990 to 1996 most accused persons subject to the jurisdiction of military courts were civilians. 138. The Court further notes that both the above-mentioned Article 299(3) of the Code of Military Justice and the criminal offense of disobedience as set forth in Articles 334, 336, and 337, Title VII, Book III of such Code on “Insubordination Criminal Offenses” applied to Mr. Palamara-Iribarne, sets forth that perpetrator of such offenses must have “military status.” 139. The Court has pointed out that the application of military justice must be