25 7(5) and 8(2) of the American Convention, “because that detention became a punitive rather than a precautionary measure”. The State did not present arguments contesting such allegations. 118. From the evidence furnished, it spring that Mr. Barreto Leiva was sentenced to one year and two months imprisonment (supra para. 22). However, he was detained for one year, two months and sixteen days.62 Consequently, the preventive detention of the victim was 16 days longer that the final sentence imposed. 119. The Tribunal has established that Article 7(5) of the Convention guarantees the right of every person to be tried within a reasonable time or to be released without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings. This right imposes temporal limits on the duration of pre-trial detention and, consequently, on the State’s power to protect the purpose of the proceedings by using this type of precautionary measure. Certainly, it is necessary to make a distinction between this provision regarding the duration of the pre-trial detention as precautionary measure and the provision contained in Article 8(1) that relates to the term for the substantiation of the proceeding. Even when they refer to different issues, both rules have the same purpose: to limit, as much as possible, the abridgement of rights of an individual. 120. When the duration of pre-trial detention exceeds a reasonable time, the State can restrict the liberty of the accused by other measures that are less harmful than deprivation of liberty by imprisonment and that ensure his presence at the trial. This right also imposes the judicial obligation to process criminal proceedings in which the accused is deprived of his liberty with greater diligence and promptness.63 121. From the principle of presumption of innocence, enshrined in Article 8(2) of the Convention, derives the obligation of the State not to restrict the liberty of a detained person beyond the limits strictly necessary to ensure that he will not impede the efficient development of an investigation and that he will not evade justice. Preventive detention is, therefore, a precautionary rather than a punitive measure.64 It is, also, the most severe measure that may be applied to the person accused of a crime. For which reason, its application must be exceptional. The rule must be the defendant’s liberty while a decision is made regarding his criminal responsibility.65 122. The preventive detention is limited by the principle of proportionality,66 by virtue of which a person that is presumed innocent cannot be treated equal to or worse than a convicted person. The State must avoid that the measure of procedural coercion be equal to or more harmful for the defendant than the punishment in case of conviction. This means that it should not be appropriate to authorize the preventive detention in cases where it is not possible to impose a prison term, and that such prison term must cease when the detention period has exceeded a 62 Judgment of the SCJ of June 13, 1996 (record of appendices to the response to petition, volume I, appendix 15, page 1182). 63 Cf. Case of Bayarri V. Argentina, supra note 21, para. 70. 64 Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero V. Ecuador, supra note 20, para. 77. 65 Cf. Case of López Álvarez V. Honduras, supra note 22, para. 67; Case of Palamara Iribarne V. Chile, supra note 21, para. 196, and Case of Acosta Calderón V. Ecuador, supra note 22, para. 74 and Case of Tibi V. Ecuador, supra note 21, para. 106. 66 Cf. Case of the "Juvenile Reeducation Institute" V. Paraguay. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 2, 2004. Series C N°112, para. 228; Case of López Álvarez V. Honduras, supra note 22, para. 67; and Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez. V. Ecuador, supra note 58, para. 93.