59 judicial remedies and measures to "restore the independence and impartiality of the Seventh Court following Judge Trejo’s abduction." In the Commission’s view, in failing to investigate Judge Trejo’s abduction and to replace him in his functions, Guatemala failed to observe its obligation to provide an effective judicial remedy. 138. Likewise, the Commission claimed that the domestic courts’ decision to release the suspects was unjustified, arbitrary and contrary to the evidence on record. According to the Commission, recourse to a court of appeal is the "vehicle whereby the legality of judicial decisions that affect the individual’s fundamental rights and freedoms is examined," by seeing that the courts of first instance ensure that the proceeding is duly implemented. The Commission considered that no adequate response was given to the appeal filed against the decision to release the suspects, there being no evidence that the Chamber of Appeals pondered or weighed its decision, nor that it considered the kidnapping of then Judge Trejo-Duque to be an important aspect in the analysis of the appeal lodged. 139. The Commission also considered that the State violated its obligation to conduct, with the means at its disposal, a serious investigation of the violations committed, identify and punish those responsible, and ensure appropriate reparations to the victims. Even though the State conducted an investigation, following Judge Trejo-Duque’s kidnapping, both the Department of the District Attorney and the judicial authorities allowed the process to stagnate and yield no result. 140. In its answer to the application, the State denied that it violated the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 8 of the Convention, inasmuch as two of the victims brought a criminal action and made formal accusations within the process, which is still open in order to clarify the facts and punish those responsible. Likewise, there has been no denial of justice in this case, since the investigation was promoted by the State without any restriction and is still being promoted officially; the State was also concerned enough to seek radical change in the administration of criminal justice when it introduced the new Code of Penal Procedure by which the case is governed today. 141. In its brief of rejoinder, the Commission alleged that the effective suspension of the judicial inquiry silenced the victims of "execrable crimes and denied them an impartial hearing …", that it had taken note of the reforms in Guatemala’s criminal court system but did not consider them germane to this case because the entry into force of new provisions could not been seen as a solution for violations committed seven years earlier and does not prove that justice is accessible to the victims and their relatives. 142. In its brief of final arguments, the Commission said that there had been multiple violations of Article 8 of the Convention: it deemed it proven that members of the Treasury Police obstructed, and did not cooperate as it should in the investigation, and that Judge Trejo-Duque’s decision of July 27, 1988 was patently arbitrary and unjustified and was not the decision of an impartial judge, owing both to the Judge’s personal circumstances and those existing in Guatemala in 1988, when, according to the Commission, the judicial independence necessary for investigating cases involving State security agents did not exist. 143. The Commission went on to say that the domestic proceeding was not conducted within the "reasonable time" required by the American Convention, since no final decision has yet been reached nor have those responsible been punished; on the contrary, the case is still at the initial investigation stage. The Commission pointed out that the judicial proceeding has not even been initiated in the cases concerning Judge Trejo-Duque’s kidnapping and the kidnapping and murder of Mr. Erik Leonardo Chinchilla and Mr. Carlos Morán-Amaya.