66. The petitioners filed the amparo suit on November 28, 2002,21 and the following day, that is November 29, 2002, the First Instance Judge for Civil Matters of Pastaza decided to process the constitutional remedy of amparo, schedule a public hearing for December 7, 2002, and order the suspension of “any current or imminent action that affects or threatens the rights contained in the complaint.”22 67. Based on Ecuadorian Constitutional Law, once an amparo remedy is lodged, a public hearing must be held at once to hear the parties. The judge shall assemble the parties immediately to hear them in a public hearing within the next twenty-four hours and, at the same time, where warranted, shall order the suspension of any act that could translate into a violation of a right. 23 68. The hearing was scheduled in the first resolution that had bearing in the amparocase, that is, on November 29, 2002, for December 7, 2002. However, according to the information provided by the petitioners, the hearing was not held on the date ordered by the court due to anomalies in the notification procedure, and it has not been held to date. 69. The Ecuadorian Political Constitution establishes that the remedy of amparo must be processed on an urgent basis and resolved within 72 hours. Within the next forty-eight hours, the judge shall issue a ruling that shall be executed immediately, although the ruling may be appealed to the Constitutional Court which may uphold or vacate it.24 70. Nonetheless, in the case at hand, 23 months have transpired since the date theamparo suit was filed, without a resolution by a competent authority. For the purposes of Article 46 of the American Convention, this situation constitutes an unwarranted delay in resolving the remedy. 71. Therefore, given the characteristics and context of the present case, the Commission believes that the exception set forth in Article 46(2)(c) of the American Convention is applicable, in addition to certain considerations relating to the potential effectiveness of the available remedies, for which the requirements set forth in the American Convention regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies and, therefore, the six-month period for the lodging of the petition, are not applicable. 72. It only remains to be said that invoking the exception to the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies set forth in Article 46(2) of the Convention is closely linked to the determination of possible violations of certain rights enshrined therein, such as the right to access to justice. Nonetheless, Article 46(2), by its nature and purpose, is a norm with autonomous content vis á vis the substantive norms of the Convention. Therefore, the determination of whether exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies set forth in subparagraphs (a), (b) y (c) of that norm are applicable to the case at hand should be conducted prior to and separately from the analysis of the merits of the matter, since it must be evaluated using a different yardstick than that used to determine the violation of Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention. It should be noted that the causes and effects that prevented the exhaustion of domestic remedies will be examined in the IACHR’s Report on the merits of the dispute, in order to establish whether they constitute violations of the American Convention. 21 22 23 24 Document in the file. Document in the file. Article 95 of the Political Constitution of Ecuador, paragraph five. Article 95 of the Political Constitution of Ecuador, paragraph six. 13