10 d) The fourth objection is not preliminary in character, but rather refers to a question on the merits. 38. As to the State’s allegation of lapse, which underlies the second, third, fourth, and sixth objections, the Court observes that it is contrary to the allegation of failure to exhaust domestic remedies. These contradictory claims in the allegations to the Court do not contribute to judicial economy. 39. The Court having further found that domestic remedies were exhausted on October 22, 1993, when the Supreme Court of Justice of Peru decided the motion for review (supra 33), concludes that the alleged lapse is unfounded, since the petition was lodged with the Commission on April 18, 1994, which is within the period of six months set forth in Article 46(1)(b) of the American Convention. Given that the second, third, fourth, and sixth objections are all based on the factual assumption that the period set forth in the aforementioned Article 46(1)(b) of the Convention had expired, the Court dismisses them. 40. By means of Official Letter No. 7-5-M/255 of September 7, 1994, the State informed the Commission of the alleged lapse of the complaint. Nevertheless, that Court has determined that said complaint concerning the combination of violations, which are now alleged by the Commission before the Court was lodged within the period set forth in Article 46(1)(b) of the Convention. VIII ABSENCE OF A PRIOR DEMAND 41. The Court will proceed to consider the preliminary objection concerning the lack of a prior demand interposed by the State. 42. The fifth objection pertains to the failure to demand that the State adapt the domestic anti-terrorist legislation to the America Convention. The State maintains that the question of the compatibility or lack of compatibility of the anti-terrorist laws with the American Convention is "a domestic affair within the exclusive competence of the Peruvian authorities, and that in no way can it be dealt with in a judicial proceeding such as the present one that concerns a particular person." 43. The Commission claims that, independent of the basis of the objection, the Court has addressed this issue in Advisory Opinion OC-13, and refers it back to paragraphs 26, 27, 28 and 30. 44. Peru maintains that the alleged violation of Article 2 of the American Convention, for failure to adapt the anti-terrorist laws of Peru to the Convention, was not raised by the petitioners before the Inter-American Commission, nor was it transmitted by the Commission to the State or included in Report No. 15-A/96. According to the State, no "prior demand" was made and, therefore, it is inadmissible for the Court to consider it. 45. The Court finds the argument of Peru to be unacceptable, inasmuch as the Court can, in effect, examine in the context of a concrete case, the substance and legal effects of a domestic law from the viewpoint of the international norms for the protection of human rights to determine the compatibility of the law with those norms. 46. Although the Commission has not raised the alleged violation of Article 2 of the Convention in the application to the Court, the Court is authorized to examine the issue motu proprio. Article 2 of the Convention, like Article 1(1), sets forth a