9 with the October 22, 1993 Judgment of the Supreme Court of Peru, the Court dismisses the argument of the State. VII LAPSING 35. The Court will now consider the second, third, fourth, and sixth preliminary objections pertaining to the alleged lapse of the complaint to the Commission and of the application to the Court. 36. As to this point, the State argues that: a) on the date the complaint was lodged with the Commission or when the Commission transmitted the pertinent parts of it to Peru, the six month period from the date on which the alleged victim was notified of a final judgment as established by Articles 46(1)(b) and 47(a) of the American Convention and by Article 38 of the Regulation of the Commission had already expired, inasmuch as in this case this period should be counted "from the end of the trial in the Exclusive Military Jurisdiction with the execution of the Judgment of August 11, 1993, or September 24, 1993." The State also argued that the Commission was opportunely informed of that circumstance on September 7, 1994; b) the lapse does not only refer to the trial of Cantoral-Benavides in the military court but also to his alleged arbitrary and illegal arrest, his alleged torture and illegal treatment at the hands of members of DINCOTE on February 6, 1993, and his alleged arbitrary detention due to the order to release his twin brother, Luis Fernando Cantoral-Benavides, instead of ordering his freedom in accordance with the judgment rendered on August 11, 1993 by the Supreme Court of Military Justice; and c) it is also untimely to make the demand in the application, Section I.(7) Purpose of the Application, for compensation, as the period to make this demand had already expired. 37. As to this point, the Commission argued that: a) when the State made its allegations concerning lapse it was confused as to the manner in which the time periods should be calculated, since the petition was lodged with the Commission on the date of April 18, 1994, four days before the expiration of the six month period, as counted from the Judgment of October 22, 1993; the original text of the petition was received on April 20, 1994, within the period established by Article 46(1)(b) of the Convention, and the Commission transmitted this petition to Peru on August 24, 1994; b) Peru contradicted itself when it alleged, on the one hand, that domestic remedies had not been exhausted at the time that the petition was lodged with the Commission and, by maintaining on the other, that when the petition was filed the time period to do so had expired. c) Peru could have interposed objections of untimeliness in the proceedings before the Commission, but it did so only subsequently before the Court; and