289. From the bundle of domestic investigations in the case file before the Commission, it is observed that from the beginning of the investigation there were important omissions that affected the possibility to learn the truth of the events. The Commission notes that these omissions by military and civilian authorities in charge of the case were established from the outset of the domestic proceedings. Thus, drawing from the statements of the domestic authorities, inter alia, the Commission highlights the following inconsistencies and omissions in the investigation: a. The employees of “SIJIN” that collected the body, “did not adopt indispensable measures to preserve the crime scene and guarantee the chain of custody or collect the remains in it, or the incriminated weapon, as well as other characteristics of the fire arms that were carried by the patrol, or undertake a ballistic comparison with regards to the “casing that was apparently found by the relatives of the deceased;” b. The “recovered projectiles” were apparently “lost in the Attorney General’s office of Barrancabermeja, a surprising aspect that has yet to be clarified;” c. The visual inspection of the crime scene and the reconstruction of the events were done “many years later, at a different time, without the participation of the witnesses, especially Ángel María Noriega Gómez, or experts in ballistics and mapping;” d. The record keeping of the shifts and archives of the Nueva Granada Battalion, Counterguerrillas No. 45 “Héroes de Majagual”, or the military bases of Aguabarranca, the refinery, ECOPETROL, or the Bucaramanga gaula were not revised “to verify the tactical antecedents of the case that could eventually clarify the events and confirm which vehicles were in use at the time;” e. “On page 503” “TE PRIETO, ST. FONSECA, SL. LARA y al TC. Sánchez” were included as members of the armed forces in the operation, and not the “defendant soldiers and their colleagues and supervisors as direct authors of the death of Mr. Wilfredo Quiñónez Bárcenas, especially Tabares y Tarazona, who apparently died;” f. The reasons for the deployment of the troops were not clarified, “if it was a ghost plan in the north Eastern part of the city of Barrancabermeja, specifically in the neighborhoods of: La Paz, La Esperanza and Primero de Mayo, to try and locate the authors of the killing of four volunteer soldiers of the Counter-guerrillas No. 45 Battalion, that were shot to death in a shop in la Esperanza neighborhood”’; g. The “amount, characteristics and origin of the automotive vehicles used were not identified, truck, van, etc., one of which apparently had license plates ending in number 677;” h. “The distance between the vehicles and their occupants: the precise circumstances in which the attack started, the response to the warning raised and the shots fired by the troops, as warning signs” were not clarified;” i. It was not clarified if the visibility conditions were optimal or otherwise, an issue that affects the possibility to realize the presence of both the military and the witness when the events took place;” j. The “identity and location of the members of the army forces that fired their duty weapons and who killed the youth” were not clarified;” k. There are inconsistencies in connection with Mr. Wilfredo Quiñónez’s corpse, which was found face down, as stated by some of the members of the military forces, “in contradiction with what is stated in pages 43 and 49 of the first notebook;”