built. 30. The grounds for all this notable development is the principle of respect for the dignity of human beings, regardless of their existential condition. By virtue of this principle, all human being, regardless of the situation and the circumstances that surround them, have a right to dignity.30 All the extraordinary development of the international legal doctrine in this regard, throughout the XX century, finds its roots – as it had to be – on some past reflections, in both juridical and philosophical thoughts,31 - for example, inter alia, on the well-known Kantian conception of human beings as a purpose in themselves.32 This is inevitable, since it reflects the maturing and refinement process of the human spirit itself, which makes the advances in the human condition itself possible.33 31. In effect, there is no way to dissociate the acknowledgment of the individual’s international juridical personality from the dignity itself of human beings. In a more ample dimension, human beings are defined as the entity that contained its supreme purpose in itself, and that fulfills it throughout their life, under their own responsibility. Effectively, it is human beings, essentially armed with dignity, who articulate, express, and introduce the “must be” of values in the reality in which they live, and only they are capable of doing so, as bearers of said ethical values. Legal personality is, at the same time, displayed as a legal category within the world of Law, as a single expression of human beings’ aptitude to be the bearer of rights and obligations within the realm of regulated behavior and human relationships.34 32. The appearance of universal human rights, as well as of the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of 1948, considerably expanded the horizon of contemporary legal doctrine, revealing the insufficiencies of the traditional conceptualization of subjective law. The urgent needs of protection for human beings were greatly responsible for this development. Universal human rights, greater and previous to the State and any form of political-social organization, and inherent to human beings, were confirmed as opposable to public power itself. 33. Human being’s international legal personality was defined as a limit to the free judgment of the State’s power. Human rights definitely opened the subjective law’s . On this principle, cf., v.g., B. Maurer, Le principe de respect de la dignité humaine et la Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme, Aix-Marseille/Paris, CERIC, 1999, pp. 7-491; [Several Authors,] Le principe du respect de la dignité de la personne humaine (Actes du Séminaire de Montpellier de 1998), Strasbourg, Conseil de l'Europe, 1999, pp. 15-113; E. Wiesel, "Contre l'indifférence", in Agir pour les droits de l'homme au XXIe. siècle (ed. F. Mayor), Paris, UNESCO, 1998, pages 87-90. 30 . For an exam of individual subjectivity within philosophical thoughts, cf., v.g., A. Renaut, L'ère de l'individu - Contribution à une histoire de la subjectivité, [Paris,] Gallimard, 1991, pages 7-299. 31 . E. Kant, Fondements de la métaphysique des moeurs (1785), Paris, Libr. Delagrave, 1999, pages 46, 103, 125-129, 136-137, 159, 164, and 166-167; I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006 [reprint], pages 17, 183, and 209; and cf. E. Kant, Leçons d'éthique (1775-1780), Paris, Livr. de Poche/Classiques de Philosophie, 1997, page 335. 32 . A.A. Cançado Trindade, "A Consolidação da Personalidade e da Capacidade Jurídicas do Indivíduo como Sujeito do Direito Internacional", 16 Anuario del Instituto Hispano-LusoAmericano de Derecho Internacional - Madrid (2003) pages 278-280. 33 . Cf., in this sense, v.g., L. Recaséns Siches, Introducción al Estudio del Derecho, 12a. ed., México, Ed. Porrúa, 1997, pages 150-151, 153, 156, and 159. 34