10 have differences on other facts having to do with reparations and their scope; it is those differences that the Court is deciding in this judgment. 39. The provision applicable to reparations is Article 63(1) of the American Convention, which states the following: 1. If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measures or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party. 40. As the Court has stated (Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Reparations (Art. 63(1), American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of September 10, 1993. Series C No. 15, para. 43), this Article codifies a rule of customary law which is one of the fundamental principles of modern international law, that being the responsibility of States (Cf. Factory at Chorzow Case, Jurisdiction, Judgment No. 8, 1927, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 9, p. 21 and Factory at Chorzow Case, Merits, Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 17, p. 29; Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949, page 184). This is the case law of this Court (Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Compensatory Damages (Art. 63(1), American Convention on Human Rights). Judgment of July 21, 1989. Series C No.7, para. 25; Godínez Cruz Case, Compensatory Damages (Art. 63(1), American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of July 21, 1989. Series C No. 8, para. 23; El Amparo Case, Reparations (Art. 63(1), American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of September 14, 1996. Series C No. 28, para. 14; Neira Alegría et al. Case, Reparations (Art. 63(1), American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of September 19, 1996. Series C No. 29, para. 36; and Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Reparations (Art. 63(1), American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of January 29, 1997. Series C No. 31, para. 15]. The case law also holds that the obligation embodied in this article is a necessary corollary of the right (decision of rapporteur Max Huber, dated 23.X.1924, in the case of British Property in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, Compromis, U.N., Recueil des sentences arbitrales, vol. II, p. 641; Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Second Phase), Judgment, I.C.J. Recueil 1970, p. 33). When an unlawful act imputable to a State occurs, said State becomes internationally responsible for a violation of international law. It is out of this responsibility that a new juridical relationship for the State emerges, which is the obligation to make reparation. While in both jurisprudence and doctrine there is a certain degree of consensus regarding how the rule enunciated in Article 63(1) of the American Convention is to be interpreted and applied, the Court believes that some clarification is in order. 41. First, some explanation of the terminology employed is useful. Reparation is a generic term that covers the various ways a state may make amends for the international responsibility it has incurred. The specific method of reparation varies according to the damage caused; it may be restitutio in integrum of the violated rights, medical treatment to restore the injured person to physical health, an obligation on the part of the State to nullify certain administrative measures, restoration of the good name or honor that were stolen, payment of an indemnity, and so on. When the right to life is violated, as it was in the instant case, given the nature of the right violated, the reparation is primarily in the form of some pecuniary compensation, as has been the practice of this Court (Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment on July 29, 1988. Series C. No. 4, para. 189; Godínez Cruz Case,