39 again raising issues regarding the merits of the case. However, the Court deems that, in view of the estoppel principle, to which it has resorted several times in its case law,20 acknowledgment of the facts set forth in the application and recognition of responsibility regarding those facts, made by the State in the instant case, must be given full import. Therefore, the evidence being assessed in the framework of this judgment is that which seeks to establish the relevant facts in the reparations stage, that is, pertaining to the following issues: what was the damage caused, what reparations should be ordered, and who should be the beneficiaries of said reparations. 53. It should be stated that in its September 18, 2000 brief, the State commented on the reparations briefs of the representatives of the victims and the next of kin, as well as of the Commission. Nevertheless, in its November 15, 2001 brief, Venezuela asked that the September 18, 2000 brief with observations on reparations be “annulled”. As a consequence of this, the statements contained in the brief on reparations filed by the representatives of the victims and of the next of kin and that by the Commission, on matters such as composition of the families of said victims and their income and their contributions to cover the needs of the household, were no longer controverted by the State. While the State attempted to change that position in its June 18 and July 22, 2002 briefs, in which it questioned the arguments of its counterparts regarding reparations, the Court must give full import to the November 15, 2001 brief, in view of the estoppel principle. 54. Developing the precedents of its case law on this matter,21 the Court deems it relevant to establish that when the State does not respond to the reparations brief or application, or when it desists from the respective reply, this will constitute an indication in demonstation of the facts on which it remained silent or which the subsequently abandoned reply had addressed, so these facts will be considered proven insofar as no evidence appears that is capable of weakening them, and that other evidence is gathered which, without necessarily being conclusive, contributes to support their veracity. 55. For the purposes of the instant judgment and according to its usual practice, the Court has taken into account, first of all, that the criteria for assessment of the evidence by an international human rights court are broader than those applied by domestic courts, so it has a much greater degree of flexibility than the latter to assess, based on the rules of logic and on experience,22 the evidence submitted regarding relevant facts, and to resort, specifically, to indirect evidence –such as circumstantial evidence, indications and presumptions-. Despite the above, when it resorts to indirect evidence the Court takes care to examine whether the items of evidence are coherent, whether they corroborate each other, and whether they are in harmony with the whole body of evidence.23 20 Cf. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community Case. Preliminary Objections. February 1, 2000 Judgment. Series C No. 66, para. 57; Durand and Ugarte Case. Preliminary Objections. May 28, 1999 Judgment. Series C No. 50, para. 38; and Garrido and Baigorria Case. Reparations (Art. 63(1) American Convention on Human Rights). August 27, 1998 Judgment. Series C No. 39, para. 46. 21 Hilaire, Constantine, Benjamin et al. Case, supra note 2, para. 67; Bámaca Velásquez Case. November 25, 2000 Judgment. Series C No. 70, para. 100; and “Street Children” Case (Villagrán Morales et al.). November 19, 1999 Judgment. Series C No. 63, para. 68. 22 Cf. Hilaire, Constantine, Benjamin et al. Case, supra note 2, para. 65; Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community Case. August 31, 2001 Judgment. Series C No. 79, para. 89; and Ivcher Bronstein Case. February 6, 2001 Judgment. Series C No. 74, paras. 65 and 66.