35 President of the Republic to forbid the opening of an investigation on crimes allegedly committed by members of the military or to dismiss charges in those already begun. This situation has partly been corrected through approval of the Organic Criminal Procedural Code and modifications to the Military Justice Code, now the Organic Military Justice Code. However, the later Code maintains exorbitant powers for the President of the Republic in the ambit of military jurisdiction. The Criminal Code, as amended in the year 2000, defines the crime of forced disappearance of persons, but does so in restrictive terms, as it only refers to the responsibility of whoever deprives someone of his or her liberty and “refuses to recognize the detention or to provide information on the whereabouts or situation of the missing person.” Summary execution is only considered under the general crime of homicide and the general aggravation of committing a crime with abuse of authority. Certain definitions of crimes refer only to acts or omissions by public officials that are contrary to liberty and humane treatment, among others. These shortcomings conspired against investigation of the facts because it was not possible to directly prosecute the crime of forced disappearance of persons or summary execution. The expert witness deems it necessary to modify the restrictive definition of the crime of forced disappearance of persons and to include in the Criminal Code the regulation of summary or arbitrary executions. However, he believes that the greatest difficulty for justice to be served is not the existence of an insufficient legal framework but rather official strategy. The expert witness also deems that three aspects of military legislation hindered enjoyment of the rights enshrined in the Convention: - Objective and subjective extension of military jurisdiction, which is given competence even when civilians are allegedly involved and without taking into account performance of military functions proper. This situation is contrary to the 1999 Constitution even though its enactment has not led to revision of Articles 123 and 128 of the Organic Military Justice Code. Intervention of the Public Prosecutor’s Office in military proceedings is restricted, as military legislation only foresees intervention by the Military Attorney General and the Military Prosecutors, who are furthermore appointed by the President. - Breadth of powers of the Executive, and especially of the President, with respect to commencement or continuation of the investigation or the criminal proceeding, which allows crimes against human rights committed by the military to remain unpunished. The 1998 amendment of the Military Justice Code established a restrictive list of crimes in connection with which the high executive authorities could exercise such exorbitant powers, but this list continues to be very broad. It even places in the hands of those authorities decisions regarding prosecution of grave violations to International Humanitarian Law. - Lack of precautionary mechanisms that ensure independence of military courts is a structural flaw of military jurisdiction which incapacitates it from dispensing justice in accordance with international human rights law. Military judges are appointed by the President of the Republic among active officers who, after they finish their appointment, go back to their habitual military tasks, which makes them vulnerable to intervention by their hierarchical superiors. Therefore, the witness deems that competence of the military courts should be restricted to the ambit of military discipline, that is, to hear breaches of military duties while in active service. Furthermore, appointment