23 82. The rest of the basis for the judgment pertains to imposition of accessory punishment and, therefore, is not relevant to this analysis. 83. The Commission finds that this basis for the judgment shows that the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court did not engage in a review of the trial court judgment pursuant to the requirements set forth in Article 8.2.h of the American Convention, which were described above in the instant report. The judicial authority did not provide the reasons why it considered that, based on its review of the judgment, responsibility continued to be proven nor did it individually refer by specific name to the different defendants, even though a separate and distinct assessment of each one of them was laid out in the trial court judgment. The Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court did not rule on the procedural violations either, specifically on whether the judgment of the court was consistent with the principle of the presumption of innocence. 84. Subsequently, Mr. Zegarra Marín filed a motion to review the conviction on November 5, 1999 with the Supreme Court of Justice for the alleged violation of the principle of the presumption of innocence in the judgment of conviction of November 8, 1996. Based on the proven facts, the Supreme Court denied the motion because the grounds were not covered in the criminal procedural law, specifically, in Article 361 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as valid for the admissibility of a motion to review conviction. The Commission notes the two Supreme Court members who were called upon to examine the admissibility of the motion for review and to issue a report on it with regard to the basis upon which it was denied, put on the record that that it had constituted a violation of the principle of the presumption of innocence and of reversal of the burden of proof with respect to Mr. Zegarra Marín, even noting the specific provisions of the Constitution and the law that were violated by the Fifth Chamber for Criminal Matters. Notwithstanding, they noted that there was a legal limitation on granting the motion and that there needed to be legislative reforms to remedy this. Hence, the judicial authorities took note of the violation of the constitutional protections, and did not order any measures to remedy it in violation of the right to judicial protection. 85. In conclusion, the Commission considers that: i) the motion to set aside judgment filed by Mr. Zegarra Marín did not meet the standards of the right to appeal the judgment; and ii) Mr. Zegarra Marín did not have an effective remedy available to him either through the motion to set aside the judgment or by means of the motion for review of judgment, vis-à-vis the violation of the principle of the presumption of innocence caused by the trial court judgment of conviction. 86. Based on the foregoing considerations, the Commission concludes that the State violated the right to appeal the judgment and the right to judicial protection as established in Articles 8.2.h and 25 of the American Convention, in connection with the obligations established in Article 1.1 thereof, to the detriment of Mr. Zegarra Marín. V. CONCLUSIONS 87. Based on the considerations of fact and law set forth above, the Commission concludes that the State of Peru is responsible for the violation of the right to the presumption of innocence and of the right to appeal the judgment and to judicial protection as established in Articles 8.1, 8.2 and 25 of the American Convention, in connection with the obligations set forth in Article 1.1 of thereof, to the detriment of Mr. Zegarra Marín.