3. Analysis of the case 66. The Commission observes that in this case, the State is presumed responsible for the deaths of the seven inmates in the injuries of the 26 inmates in its custody, which has not been contradicted in this case because the State has not provided a “satisfactory explanation,” and has even stated that National Guard members caused the deaths of the seven deceased inmates in a way that “could perfectly be characterized as extralegal, arbitrary, or summary executions.” The Commission observes that the case file in this case does not properly clear up the specific way in which these deaths and injuries were caused, or the specific role of the soldiers and prison guards present at the prison that day. Without prejudice to the fact that this presumption that has not been credibly challenged by the State is sufficient to establish the State’s international responsibility, the Commission will now analyze the additional elements found in the case file that strengthen that conclusion. 67. The State must “supervise that [its] police forces, which are attributed the legitimate use of force, respect the right to life of those under their jurisdiction.”130 In this regard, State security forces can only use lethal weapons when “strictly inevitable to protect a life” and when less extreme measures are ineffective.131 The use of force by security forces “must respect criteria of legitimate reasons, need, [...] and proportionality.”132 Likewise, “any use of force that is not strictly necessary owing to the behavior of the person detained constitutes an attack on human dignity.”133 68. In the context of maintaining public order within prisons, the Court has established that the State must use force “in accordance with and in application of domestic legislation in ensuring public order, as long as this legislation and the actions taken when applying it are compatible, at the same time, to the applicable human rights protection norms.” In this sense, State power is not limitless.134 69. In this case, the Commission observes that it does not have enough evidence to determine with certainty whether a riot took place within the prison on the morning of the facts. This lack of clarity is fundamentally the result of a lack of due diligence in the investigation of the facts, which will be examined in the next section. While the inmate witnesses from the prison are consistent in stating that the prison was quiet that morning during the search being conducted following the strike of the previous week, the Intervention Director and other authorities state that there were disturbances inside the prison that led to the request for the National Guard to enter the prison. In any case, the Commission observes that only the National Guard members said the deaths and injuries took place prior to their entry into the penitentiary. This version was not confirmed even by the Intervention Director. The Commission thus finds that, should it be proven that there was no riot in the prison that morning, any subsequent use of force by State agents against the prison inmates would be clearly arbitrary, as it would lack a legitimate purpose and be unnecessary.135 70. Even accepting that the actions taken by State authorities on the day of the facts had the legitimate purpose of controlling a riot taking place within the prison to protect the lives of the inmates, the Commission nevertheless finds that multiple elements point to a disproportionate use of force. In this regard, the IACHR highlights inmate statements indicating that the National Guard entered the facility firing light automatic rifles; that they indiscriminately beat the inmates in the yard; that one inmate “was ruptured inside” as a result of beating by the authorities, and needed an operation; and that the soldiers who entered the facility did not use riot control equipment or even less lethal means of controlling the situation within the prison. None of these elements were effectively challenged by the State through a diligent investigation demonstrating that the use of force was strictly proportional to the risks arising from the alleged riot. 71. Along with this, there is evidence both from the autopsies—which found that several inmates died from bullet wounds to the head with trajectories that went from the back to front—as well as the inmates I/A Ct. H.R. Case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru. Judgment of November 25, 2006, para. 238. Id. at Para. 239. Also see UN. Basic Principles on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials. 132 I/A Ct. H.R. Case of Fleury et al. v. Haiti. Judgment of November 23, 2011, para. 74. 133 Id. 134 I/A Ct. H.R. Case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru. Judgment of November 25, 2006, para. 240. 135 In this sense, see id. at paras. 234-252. 130 131 15