8 Confronted with this brazen incursion into the legal system, the Argentine Supreme Court responded diligently, listening to each and every one of Mr. Cantos’ motions, however irrelevant and immaterial they were. The Commission did not prove a single fact showing that the Argentine State had contributed to needless delays in the Supreme Court proceedings. b) The Argentine Republic has not committed any violation of Article 25 of the Convention because: The ruling handed down by the Supreme Court was a just one. Contrary to its own doctrine and the case law of this Honorable Court, the Commission appears to be equating a sentence unfavorable to the plaintiff with a denial of justice. The temper of the judgment with regard to the alleged 1982 agreement was due entirely to the fact that Mr. Cantos invoked this instrument for the sole purpose of benefiting from a statute of limitations five times longer than he would be entitled to under his original claim. The Argentine State never acknowledged any debt in Mr. Cantos’ favor. Any documents he submitted to that effect are, at best, of doubtful authenticity and have been disclaimed time and time again. They could never be taken seriously in a court of law to attribute any blame to the Argentine Republic. It was Mr. Cantos who never made clear in his claim exactly what blame he sought to attribute to the Argentine Republic and the Province of Santiago del Estero. It was Mr. Cantos who never proved the legal status of the businesses that he claimed to own, which is why the Supreme Court denied him active legitimation. The statute of limitations that expired in the case was simply the mandatory application of the law, based on the claim that Mr. Cantos himself articulated, and that the courts are by law obligated to observe. It was Mr. Cantos who brought a claim long after the statute of limitations had run. It was Mr. Cantos who brought a claim seeking exorbitant sums, but then, contrary to the terms set out in his own complaint, claimed that unspecified amounts were involved. Mr. Cantos lost the benefit of litigating without paying filing fees because his witnesses failed to convince the court that he qualified for this exception; it follows, then, that he cannot rightfully blame the Argentine State for the consequences of his own conduct. Mr. Cantos was ordered to pay costs. Having lost the benefit of litigating without paying filing fees and having been ordered to pay filing fees and the fees of the opposing side’s attorneys, both consequences of the fact that he was litigating a baseless complaint, Mr. Cantos had to pay the costs of his unfounded claim. Mr. Cantos could have used the domestic courts to challenge the constitutionality of the decision and the sum he was ordered to pay, but chose not to do so. He opted instead to turn to this international forum to bring a baseless charge of unfairness. However, what is most objectionable is that after having to underwrite costs that Mr. Cantos was ordered to pay, the Argentine State now finds itself in an international court, having to defend itself against charges that it denied Mr. Cantos justice. One has to ask, how was justice denied in this case and how was the right to a hearing “within a reasonable time” violated when Mr. Cantos spent years litigating his case before Argentina’s highest court, manipulating the duration of the proceedings to fit his curious strategy and without putting out a single penny? IV COMPETENCE 25. The Court’s competence to hear this case was one of the preliminary objections decided in the judgment of September 7, 2001. There, the Court held that it is competent to hear all proceedings that occurred subsequent to September 5, 1984, if it were alleged that those proceedings per se constituted violations of the American Convention. Mr. Cantos began his case with the Supreme Court of