24 State, even if they had been committed by a provincial government. Irrespective of the legal validity or efficacy of the agreement in the domestic courts, its purpose is to acknowledge the State’s responsibility for the damages caused to Mr. Cantos. 45. In its submissions, the Inter-American Commission requested that the Court find that there had been a violation of Article XVIII (right to a fair trial) and Article XXIV (right of petition) of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and Articles 8, 25, 21 and 1(1) of the American Convention. The State’s arguments 46. The State denies that Articles 8, 25 and 1(1) were violated in the Supreme Court case, and supports its contention with the following arguments: a. The actions that Mr. Cantos undertook to claim sums of money were in the form of an ordinary civil action proceeding; in such actions, it is the plaintiff that prosecutes the suit or engages in the activity that will move the case forward. From December 11, 1989 until February 28, 1995, Mr. Cantos “did nothing to move the case forward.” Hence, there has been no violation of the reasonable time principle contemplated in Article 8(1) of the American Convention. In fact, “given the dimensions and complexity of case C-1099, the time taken to hear the suit in the domestic courts was anything but unreasonable; the case took approximately five years. The other five years can be blamed entirely on the plaintiff’s failure to take action to move his case forward”; b. The Commission acknowledged the complexity of this case. However, the Commission’s contention was that the complexity of the case was due to the fact that the Supreme Court had to delve into an examination of the evidence compiled in order to determine whether the agreement claimed by Mr. Cantos was a valid one and thus determine which statute of limitations (two-year or ten-year) applied in this case. As for the plaintiff’s procedural activity, the State argued that “[…] Mr. Cantos […] did not move the proceedings forward as was his duty in a case governed by dispositive principle and […] that the only procedural activity in which he engaged can best be described as delaying tactics.” It added that from December 11, 1989 to February 28, 1995, the plaintiff ��did nothing to move the case forward.” The State argued that the Supreme Court acted “diligently and efficiently on every one of Mr. Cantos’ petitions, no matter how out of order and dilatory they may have been.” The plaintiff never filed a complaint challenging the rulings on his petitions, nor did he demand that they be quickly dispatched. c. As for the injustice of the withholding of the documents, the State contends that the application ignores “the Commission’s own doctrine in that it clearly does not have competence to hear claims alleging that a judicial decision is unjust.” The label “unjust” is brandished because the Supreme Court’s ruling did not recognize the validity of an agreement concluded on July 15, 1982 and subsequently authenticated by the Minister of Government, but not because domestic law was used to circumvent international obligations. The State reasoned that “both the agreement and the authentication are absolutely null and void because the object of the agreement is prohibited and […] because they do not have the essentials of