7 all situations, even those not contemplated in treaty-based provisions. To this end, the Martens clause invoked “the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established,” and also the “laws of humanity” and “the dictates of the public conscience.” Subsequently, the Martens clause again appeared in the common provisions relating to denunciation of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions on international humanitarian law (Articles 63/62/142/158), and in Additional Protocol I (1977) to the Conventions (Article 1(2)) – to cite some of the principal international humanitarian law conventions. For more than a century, this clause has continued to be valid. 22. The Martens clause maintains that the principles of international law, the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience continue to be applicable, irrespective of the emergence of new situations. Accordingly, the said clause (which forms part of general international law) prevents non liquet, and plays an important role in the hermeneutics of humanitarian legislation. The “laws of humanity” and the “requirements of the public conscience,” which it invokes, fall within the domain of jus cogens. In summary, the Martens clause, as a whole, has been conceived and repeatedly affirmed to the benefit of the whole human race, thus ensuring its continuing relevance; it can be considered an expression of the reason of humanity, imposing limits on the reason of State (raison d'État).25 23. This judgment of the Inter-American Court in the Case of Plan de Sánchez Massacre goes beyond the common denominator of international human rights law and international humanitarian law and contains conceptual elements that belong to international refugee law. For example, this is the case of the specific reference to the criterion of the “justified fear of persecution” (para. 42(29)), inherent in the latter aspect of human rights protection. Indeed, events such as those of the instant case (massacres and “scorched earth” policies) generated fear, and gave rise to forced displacements and the arrival of Guatemalan refugees in Mexico, particularly after 1981-1982).26 This case brings into evidence the rapprochement or convergence between the three aspects of protection, which, as I have been maintaining for several years, are to be found at the normative and hermeneutical level and also at the operational level, in order to maximize the protection of human rights.27 IV. Aggravated International Responsibility 24. The fact that the Inter-American Court lacks jurisdiction to determine violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (1948) 25 A.A. Cançado Trindade, "Reflexiones sobre el Desarraigo como Problema de Derechos Humanos Frente a la Conciencia Jurídica Universal", in La Nueva Dimensión de las Necesidades de Protección del Ser Humano en el Inicio del Siglo XXI (A.A. Cançado Trindade and J. Ruiz de Santiago), 1a. ed., San José, Costa Rica, UNHCR, 2001, pp. 19-78, esp. pp. 58-78. 26 UNHCR, Memoria-Presencia de los Refugiados Guatemaltecos en México, México, UNHCR/Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados, 1999, pp. 41, 45, 167, 235 and 314; A. Rouquié, Guerras y Paz en América Central, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1994, pp. 152-153 and 325. 27 Cf. A.A. Cançado Trindade, Tratado de Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos, tome I, 1a. ed., Porto Alegre, S.A. Fabris Ed., 1997, chap. VIII, pp. 269-352; A.A. Cançado Trindade, El Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos en el Siglo XXI, Santiago de Chile, Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 2001, chap. V, pp. 183-265; A.A. Cançado Trindade, Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, Derecho Internacional de los Refugiados y Derecho Internacional Humanitario - Aproximaciones y Convergencias, Ginebra, ICRC, [2001], pp. 1-66.