SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE SERGIO GARCIA-RAMIREZ IN THE JUDGMENT RENDERED IN THE CASE OF PLAN DE SANCHEZ MASSACRE V. GUATEMALA, ON APRIL 29, 2004 1. I concur with the judges of the Inter-American Court in issuing the judgment on the merits in the Case of Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, issued on April 29, 2004. I add this separate opinion, in which I examine certain points of said ruling, as well as its possible implications. 2. Solution of an adjudicatory case may be expressed in various judicial and extra-judicial acts, which may have repercussions on the former. Extra-judicial acts that pertain to agreements among the parties appear at any time prior to when the proceeding commences, and even during it, especially –as regards the interAmerican system for protection of human rights- during the stage of processing before the Commission. With respect to the period of the court proceeding, strictly speaking, the solution occurs through one or several judgments that decide on the merits (declaratory) and on the corresponding consequences (sentencing), or by means of an act that establishes a specific judicial ruling that ends the dispute, in all its expressions, or a part of it, leaving solution of the remaining parts pending, subject to another ruling of the Court, whether or not prepared by new acts of the parties geared toward an agreement. 3. The rules of the Inter-American process reflect the latter possibility under the item regarding “Early Termination of the Proceedings” (Chapter V of the Rules of Procedure), which includes as causes for discontinuance of the case, both the decision of the applicant not to proceed with it and acquiescence by the respondent (Article 54). I have referred elsewhere to acquiescence within inter-American adjudicatory proceedings (see my Separate concurring opinions in the Case of Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala, November 25, 2003 Judgment, paras. 10, 11, 13, 17, 18, 21, 24 and 30; and Case of Bulacio v. Argentina, September 18, 2003 Judgment, para. 7). The amendments to the Rules of Procedure on November 25, 2003 recognized that said procedural act pertains to the “claims” of the applicant, not to the “facts” alleged by the applicant, the admission of which amounts, strictly speaking, to a confession. 4. Of course, neither acquiescence to the claims nor confession are binding for the Inter-American Court: confession is not, because the court has the power to establish the value and scope of any evidence. Nor is acquiescence -or, if applicable, the decision not to proceed with the case- because the court itself may order that examination of the case continue to ensure better protection of human rights, even if such acts have occurred. Therefore, the interests and requirements of justice are above the interests or the will of the party, and the former are geared toward protection of human rights in the specific case, but also toward potential solution of other cases, both regarding international jurisdiction itself and regarding domestic jurisdictions, by expressing a criterion that leads to that end. This is one of the aspirations and one of the characteristic features of international justice in the field of human rights. Therefore, substantive matters prevail over formal ones. 5. Contrary to what happens in other types of trial, the parties cannot withdraw the case, on their own, from being heard by the court and, therefore, from the