“quantification” of moral damage is, in turn, undertaken to the benefit essentially of those still living (direct or indirect victims) (para. 74). III. The Duty of Remembrance and the Need for it 11. The passing of time imposes, in addition, the duty of remembrance and emphasizes the need for it. Each person has a “spiritual patrimony” to preserve, hence the need to cultivate memory to preserve identity, both at personal and collective levels.2 Oblivion enhances the vulnerability of the human condition,3 and cannot be imposed (not even by “legal” contrivances, such as amnesty or the statute of limitations): there is an ethical obligation of remembrance. 4 In the above-mentioned Separate Opinion in the case of the Moiwana Community versus Suriname (2005), I went as far as to point out that: "It is incumbent upon all of us, the still living, to resist and combat oblivion, so commonplace in our post-modern, ephemeral times. The dead need our faithfulness; they are entirely dependent upon it. The duties of the living towards them (...) encompass perennial remembrance. They need our remembrance today and tomorrow, just as much as we needed their advice and care yesterday. Time, thus, instead of keeping us apart, on the contrary, brings all of us —the living and the dead— together. This, in my view, ascribes an entirely new dimension to the links of solidarity between the living and their dead. Remembrance is a manifestation of gratitude, and gratitude is perhaps the noblest manifestation of rendering true justice" (para. 93). 12. Awareness of the duty of remembrance seems to be developing in our times on a universal scale. Recently, for the first time in history, the General Assembly of the United Nations held a special session (the 28 th) on January 24, 2005, specifically for the purpose of commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of the Nazi concentration and death camps. During the special session, Delegations from several countries emphasized the importance of the duty of remembrance (invoked by Bulgaria, Belarus, and Benin),5 even to combat historical revisionism (as stressed by Russia and Italy),6 and the general indifference that has unfortunately surrounded successive atrocities in contemporary history (as noted by Canada, Tanzania, Rwanda, Kenya, and New Zealand).7 In addition, some delegations expressed their repudiation of State crime (such as the Armenian Delegation).8 13. The 28th special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations was effectively garnished with significance and symbolism, at a time when direct witnesses (the survivors) of these atrocities are growing old and will not be around . Juan Pablo II, Memoria e Identidad - Conversaciones al Filo de Dos Milenios, Buenos Aires, Ed. Planeta, 2005, pp. 95, 109, 131, 176-177 and 183. 2 . 375. 3 Cf., in that regard, P. Ricoeur, La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli, Paris, Éd. Seuil, 2000, pp. 374- . Cf., in that regard, N. Weill, "Y a-t-il un bon usage de la mémoire?", in Devoir de mémoire, droit à l'oubli? (ed. Th. Ferenczi), Bruxelles, Éditions Complexe, 2002, p. 227. 4 . ONU/A.G. (28e. session extraordinaire), Soixante ans après la libération des camps de concentration - Communiqué de presse AG/10330, dated 24.01.2005, N.Y., N.U., 2005, pp. 8, 9 and 1011, respectively. 5 . Ibid., pp. 4 and 5, respectively. . Ibid., pp. 6, 9 and 11, respectively. . Ibid., p. 6. 6 7 8