4 11. As a result of this, the convict becomes a victim of the State whose role in punishing criminal behavior has gone astray from its purpose and overstepped its mark. Certainly, the need — and the public duty — to decisively fight crime and punish offenders is undeniable. What is objectionable is that this punitive role, in itself lawful, be carried out in such a manner and by such means as to render it grievous to human dignity and that conflict with the ethical standards that must be the hallmark of the democratic State in the exercise of all of its powers, including the power to punish. As I have stated in the past, it is in the punitive order, perhaps more than in others, that the political convictions and moral design of a State become apparent. 12. The foregoing is applicable regardless of whether the individual involved be, in turn, a victimizer in the commission of a punishable offense. If his criminal liability is established, the individual must be punished. It seems unnecessary to say —though perhaps suitable to insist on making the point once more—that in human rights violation proceedings the perpetration of this kind of violations is only and exclusively on trial and not the criminal liability of the individual, which must be established by the appropriate domestic courts in accordance with domestic law, and punished in a lawful manner, i.e. compatible with the provisions of the relevant domestic Constitution and with international provisions embraced by the State by way of conventions, or imperative provisions within the framework of jus cogens. Once again, it should be noted that a lawful purpose must be attained through equally lawful means. 13. The survival of measures, such as flagellation of an individual, exposes once again the existence, in the midst of the XXI century, of parallel chapters in the histories of crime and the justice system developed to fight against it on behalf of society and the State. It is, of course, a strange and dreadful parallelism, the chronicle of which is beyond the scope of this Separate Opinion, accompanying a judgment. The existence of a clear and exact borderline between crime and criminal justice —which must separate the unfair use of violence displayed by the criminal from the sanctioning role performed by the State— has not always been the case. This role should be justified, as mentioned earlier, on the ethical quality of its grounds, its means and its purposes. Criminal “justice” has frequently overstepped such mark. In this order, the Inter-American Court has joined the European Court in its eloquent reflection in the case of Tyrer v. United Kingdom, regarding corporal punishment: it is but institutionalized violence, an “assault” on a person’s dignity and physical integrity. Hence, it violates jus cogens and, for that very reason, it is deemed completely unacceptable. Rejection is absolute, beyond all historical, sociological or disciplinary reasons that may be used to support such punishment. 14. The obstinate presence of these forms of punishment, which constitute reminiscences of old oppressive practices, prompts a review of the purposes of the punishment imposed by the State on the offender. I do not deny the retributive nature the criminal sanction formally has and that has occasionally contributed to limit the display of violence, grading the punishment according to the weight of the offense committed. Nor do I oppose at this time its efficacy —more notional than real— as a way to deter (general deterrence) the commission of offenses. However, I believe it is convenient to retain for the moment, and in the absence of a better safeguard option, the project of social readaptation, reintegration or rehabilitation which has been ascribed to the penal consequences of crime and that is laid down extensively in many domestic and international documents, particularly in those