11 a violation of Article 26 of the Covenant36. The same Committee, in its general comment n. 24(52), of November 1994, warned that the provisions of the two Vienna Conventions and the classic rules on reservations (based upon reciprocity) were not appropriate to the human rights treaties; given the special character of the Covenant as a human rights treaty, the question of the compatibility of a reservation with its object and purpose, instead of being left at the discretion of the manifestations of the States Parties inter se, should be objectively determined, on the basis of juridical principles, by the Human Rights Committee itself37. 33. Given the specificity of the International Law of Human Rights, there appears a strong case for leaving the determination of the compatibility or otherwise of reservations with the object and purpose of human rights treaties with the international supervisory organs established by them, rather than with the States Parties themselves; it would be more in keeping with the special character of human rights treaties. To the two international human rights tribunals (the European and InterAmerican Courts), the individualistic system of reservations does not seem to be in keeping with the notion of collective control machinery proper to human rights treaties. The obiter dicta of the two regional Human Rights Courts have been rendered despite the fact that the European Convention (Article 64)38 and the American Convention (Article 75) on Human Rights do not expressly confer this function upon them; the American Convention, in fact, limits itself to referring to the pertinent provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 34. Given the uncertainties, ambiguities and lacunae in the present system of reservations to treaties of the two Vienna Conventions of 1969 and 1986 (supra), proposals have been advanced in contemporary doctrine39 tending at least to reduce the tension as to the proper application of human rights treaties in the matter of reservations, namely: first, the inclusion of an express indication in human rights treaties of the provisions which do not admit any reservations (such as those pertaining to the fundamental non-derogable rights), as an irreducible minimum to participate in such treaties; second, as soon as the States Parties have proceeded to the harmonization of their domestic legal order with the norms of those treaties (as required by these latter), the withdrawal of their reservations to them40; third, the modification or rectification, by the State Party, of a reservation considered nonpermissible or incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty41, whereby a reservation would thus be seen no longer as a formal and final element of the manifestation of State consent, but rather as an essentially temporal measure, to be modified or removed as soon as possible; fourth, the adoption of a possible "collegial system" for the acceptance of reservations42, so as to safeguard the normative 36 . Communication n. 196/1985, decision of 03.04.1989 (and previous decision of admissibility of 05.11.1987). 37 . Paragraphs 17 and 20; text in: U.N./Human Rights Committee, document CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, of 02.11.1994, pp. 6-7. 38 . Prior to Protocol n. 11, in the Loizidou case, supra. 39 . Cf., e.g., references in ns. (29) and (30), supra. 40 . Cf., in this line of reasoning, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993), the main document adopted by the II World Conference on Human Rights, part II, paragraph 5, and cf. part I, paragraph 26. 41 . Cf. note (28), supra. 42 . Possibility that came to be considered at the Vienna Conference which adopted the Convention of 1969.