6 the legal system. The use of such expression may nevertheless be illustrative of the court’s disapproval of the wrongful conduct. REPARATIONS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF LIABILITY 24. The case law of the Inter-American Court has been particularly dynamic and highly evolving on the subject of reparations. The development of Inter-American case law on this subject becomes obvious when reflecting upon the distance between a reparations scheme revolving around monetary compensation –which is most certainly indispensable and relevant—and another one which, in addition to compensation, makes provision for broad-scope measures aimed at securing moral satisfaction for the victims and preventing new violations: for instance, through constitutional reforms, the enactment of laws, the repealing of general-scope provisions, the annulment of proceedings and judgments, political or judicial reforms, and so on. All of this applies to the entire public structure and concerns society as a whole, in addition to benefiting a given person or group of persons whose legitimate interests and proven rights are sought to be enforced. 25. Among the measures of satisfaction ordered by the Court in the context of reparations, the acknowledgement of international liability by the State has already become systematic. The Court’s judgment certifies that such liability does in fact exist as a consequence of a wrongful act attributable to the State. Therefore, from a strictly legal perspective –i.e. for the formal validity of the judgment and compliance with the obligations thereby imposed— there is no need for the State to acknowledge its liability, but to fulfill the duties imposed by it. However, if made at a public act and in the presence of high-ranking authorities –the Court does not decide which such authorities should be present; the decision in this regard lies with the State, and it is to be consistent with the importance of the facts and the formal nature of the act–, such acknowledgement bears special moral relevance to the satisfaction of the victims or their next of kin and has political significance for the protection of human rights. 26. Such satisfaction may include –and often has, an encouraging occurrence that has been highlighted by the Court— some additional public expression. In this regard, there have been apologies to the victims or their next of kin and requests for their forgiveness, condemnations of the violations, offers to pass measures favorable to the victims and preventing new violations, etc. A deeper analysis is in order regarding the possibility, convenience and relevance of asking the authority to apologize to the victims or obtain their forgiveness, considering the nature of the “apology,” the moral qualities of which are indisputable but which calls for further consideration from the legal standpoint. 27. Generally, an apology for a serious violation is of specific ethical value for both the person offering it and the one at whom the apology is addressed. In these cases, the person offering an apology is not –even though in certain cases it might in fact be— the one who actually committed the offense. It is a formal, rather than a substantial, expression. It is the State who, acting through a state agent, apologizes for the wrongful conduct engaged in by another agent of the State. The latter one is the responsible party –morally, as well as legally–; conversely, the former is unrelated to the facts, being tied to the proceeding because of his or her official capacity and not because of his or her guilt, and is alien to the deep feelings, intimate pain and serious alterations that the facts have caused to the victim.