16 sought at “the request of the Government of Peru and, in order to ensure that no questions arise as to the correct application of the proceedings, as well as to protect the interests of both parties (the Government and the petitioners).” Principles of good faith would preclude casting doubt on the reasons given by the Commission for withdrawing its application. 53. In view of the foregoing, the Secretariat of the Court, acting on instructions of the Permanent Commission, merely acknowledged receipt of the note of withdrawal. It did not assess the action or the timing thereof because neither the Secretariat nor the Permanent Commission was in a position to do so, since the President had not yet begun to review the case, the processing of which had still not been initiated. 54. These considerations are not inconsistent with the precedents established by the Court. In a previous case (Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, supra 37, para. 75), the Court found that “the Commission’s application to the Court unequivocally shows that the Commission had concluded its proceedings and submitted the matter for judicial settlement. The presentation of the case to the Court implies, ipso jure, the conclusion of proceedings before the Commission.” On that occasion, the Court was referring to the impossibility of the Commission continuing proceedings in a case that had already been submitted to the Court. At the time, the Court did not define the meaning of “submit a case” or “file an application” nor did it, of course, refer to any subsequent motions or acts by the Commission, such as, for example, the withdrawal of a case already filed with the Court, which is precisely the issue now before the Court. 55. At this time, there is no need for the Court to rule on whether the Commission understood the withdrawal to be a cancellation of the proceedings or the abandonment of the case, even at the judicial level. The Commission has stated that this was not the case and there is nothing in the file that would indicate otherwise. Rather, the Commission’s letter of withdrawal indicates the opposite intention (cf. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1964, p. 21). 56. It is also not necessary to determine whether the prior actions of the Commission were nullified by errors in the handling of the case or whether the Government’s right of defense was impaired by the failure to transmit certain documents. 57. What must be analyzed is whether the withdrawal was instigated by the Peruvian Government and what benefits the latter could have derived from it. It is important to note that the communication from Peru requesting that “the case not be submitted to the Court” reached the Commission on the very date that the latter transmitted the case to the tribunal by fax. It is clear, therefore, that the Government could not request the withdrawal of a case which, to its knowledge, had still not been submitted. The Peruvian note nevertheless does contain the suggestion that the irregularities which -in Peru’s opinion- occurred in the handling of the case, “nullify any other proceeding to which [they] could give rise and allow Peru to disqualify itself in the future from validating such acts with its participation.” 58. It could be concluded that both issues -that is, the request that the application not be filed because of irregularities in the way it had been handled and